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I. INTRODUCTION
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLB) 1 is landmark financial services
legislation. GLB is the culmination of over thirty years of effort to reform the regulation
of financial services. 2 During this period, Congress considered numerous bills without
reaching consensus. 3 GLB was enacted on November 12, 1999, and many of its most
significant provisions became effective on March 1, 2000.4 For many observers, GLB is
notable for its repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act 5 restrictions on commercial bank
affiliates' investment banking activities. Of equal interest, however, are provisions that
widen the entrance for banks into the insurance industry. Both sets of changes are
expected to encourage further the consolidation of financial services and provide
additional competition in the offer, sale, and underwriting of insurance products and
securities.
At the same time, GLB subjects insurance affiliates of banks to "functional"
regulation by state insurance and securities regulators. Largely for historical reasons that
have little relevance in today's economy, regulation of traditional insurance products has
been relegated to the states.6 Nontraditional insurance products, such as so-called
variable insurance products that have a market return feature, are also subject to
regulation by securities regulators. Predictably, this welter of regulations and regulators
will continue to impede bank insurance activities even as GLB opens the door for their
expansion.
This Article traces the growth of insurance in America and describes how its
regulatory structure developed separately from the regulatory structure of other financial
services. The authors show how banks became involved in insurance activities as a way
to expand their traditional banking services. Regulatory restrictions at first inipeded that
effort, but GLB has now opened the door to allow greater expansion. Nevertheless, as the
Article describes, banks continue to face regulatory hurdles and restrictions under GLB
that will impair their ability to compete in the insurance business. Finally, the authors
1. Pub. L. No. 106-102 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-3222 (West Supp. 2000)).
2. Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammam, Overview of the Graram-Leach-Bliley Act, 4 N.C. BANKING
INST. 1, 1 (2000).
3. See, e.g., J. Virgil Mattingly & Keiran J. Fallon, Understanding the Issues Raised by Financial
Modernization, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 25 (1998) (discussing H.R. 10 and S. 298, the financial reform efforts in
the 105th Congress).
4. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 161, 12 U.S.C.A. § 18a n.41 (West Supp. 2000) (setting forth that most
provisions of GLB will become effective 120 days after enactment).
5. 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (also known as the
Banking Act of 1933).
6. See infra Part II.C-.F.
[Summer
Banking and Insurance: Before and After GLB
question whether the "functional" regulation on which GLB is premised is an efficient
and effective method to regulate financial products.
II. INSURANCE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Insurance is an important part of our modem financial structure, and banks play an
increasingly important role in that industry. To understand the regulatory tension created
when banks provide and market insurance products, it is important to appreciate the
background and historical antecedents of the insurance industry. For reasons that will be
explained in this part, insurance is regulated at the state level. Banking regulation is a
curious mix of state and federal regulation. 7 The regulatory complications created when
banking and insurance are offered by the same entity or in affiliated entities are self-
evident and are discussed further later in this Article. 8
A. Early History
Like other aspects of our financial system, insurance had its beginnings in ancient
societies. The annuity concept dates back to ancient Egyptian, Hindu, and Chinese
societies. 9 Life insurance appeared in Europe between the twelfth and sixteenth
centuries. 10 One such policy was issued in March of 1411, insuring the life of a pregnant
slave belonging to Barnaba Boneto in Genoa.11 Fire insurance appeared in Flanders in
the early thirteenth century. 12 A legal action on a contract of marine insurance was filed
in the City of Bruges in 1377.13
The concept of insurance was introduced in England by the Lombards in the
thirteenth century. 14 Queen Elizabeth granted rights to register assurances at the Royal
Exchange in 1574.15 Lloyd's of London began at Edward Lloyd's Coffee House in 1688,
7. Banks have a dual chartering system, permitting them to elect a national charter (and primary
regulation by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) or a state charter (and primary regulation by the
state banking authority). Even for state chartered banks, however, there is a heavy dose of federal regulation.
For state banks electing to join the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) is the primary
federal regulator. For federally insured state banks that do not join the Federal Reserve System, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is the primary federal regulator. The nonbanking activities of state or
national banks owned by a holding company are also subject to FRB regulation. See generally Jerry W.
Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 221 (2000) (discussing the
history of the dual banking regulatory system).
8. See infra Part IV.C.4.
9. CLYDE J. CROBAUGH, ANNUITIES AND THEIR USES 13 (1933).
10. C.F. TRENERRY, THE ORIGIN AND EARLY HISTORY OF INSURANCE, INCLUDING THE CONTRACT OF
BOTTOMRY 244 (Ethel Louise Gover ed., 1926).
11. HUMBERT 0. NELLI & SOGA EWEDEMI: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF INSURANCE HISTORY 56 (2d ed., School
of Bus. Admin., Ga. St. U. 1976).
12. TRENERRY, supra note 10, at 253.
13. Id. at 264.
14. JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FIRE AND LIFE INSURANCE 3-4 (Reprint ed. 1972)
(1854).
15. FRANCIS BOYER RELTON, AN ACCOUNT OF THE FIRE INSURANCE COMPANIES, ASSOCIATIONS,
INSTITUTIONS, PROJECTS AND SCHEMES ESTABLISHED AND PROJECTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND
DURING THE 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES INCLUDING THE SUN FIRE OFFICE 4-6 (1893).
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where merchants gathered to discuss shipping and its attending risks. 16 Life insurance
policies were offered in England as early as 1583.17 Life insurance was initially viewed
as gambling and was prohibited in several European countries during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. 18 To stop such gambling, insurance contracts in which there was
no "insurable interest" were considered wagers and were unenforceable at law. 19 The
requirement of an insurable interest lessened and eventually eliminated resistance to life
insurance.
Annuities were bestowed by the Crown in England or even sold by lottery to raise
funds.20 In 1694, the British government granted annuities that became the subject of
speculation. 2 1 By 1698, insurance brokers issued annuities to private purchasers, and
annuities were being used to raise capital for businesses.2 2 In 1720, the "South Sea
Bubble" involved a scheme in which the South Sea Company assumed the obligations of
annuities issued by the Crown. 23 This resulted in massive speculation in the stock of the
South Sea Company and an accompanying "bubble" in other security prices.
24 The
eventual collapse of that bubble had a devastating effect on investors.
25
Insurance in America began in the shipping industry. One means for insuring marine
cargoes during the colonial period in America was to divide the ownership of vessels
among several merchants. This spread the risk of loss among many, should the ship
founder. Later, individuals or groups of underwriters sold marine insurance. 26 The first
example of reinsurance in America appears to have occurred when Thomas Ritchie
became concerned that an overdue vessel he had insured was lost at sea. He convinced
another underwriter to assume half of his risk for a premium of twenty percent.
2 7
The Philadelphia Contributionship for the Insuring of Houses from Loss by Fire was
created in 1752.28 Benjamin Franklin was among its organizers. 29 The first stock
insurance company incorporated in America was the Baltimore Fire Insurance
Company.30 It was chartered in Maryland in 1787.31 Rhode Island became a center for
16. 1 KAILIN TUAN, MODERN INSURANCE THEORY AND EDUCATION: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF INSURANCE
EVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 17 (1972).
17. LAWRENCE F. ABBOTT, THE STORY OF NYLIC: A HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY FROM 1845 TO 1929, at 7-8 (1930).
18. SHEPARD B. CLOUGH, A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE: A HISTORY OF THE MUTUAL
FUND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, 1843-1943, at 20 (1946); VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER,
MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1979).
19. ANGELL, supra note 14, at 15.
20. CROBAUGH, supra note 9, at 17, 19.
21. RELTON, supra note 15, at 118.
22. CROBAUGH, supra note 9, at 18.
23. RELTON, supra note 15, at 118-119.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. TERENCE O'DONNELL, HISTORY OF LIFE INSURANCE IN ITS FORMATIVE YEARS 434-35 (1936); EDWIN
J. PERKINS, AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE AND FINANCIAL SERVICES, 1700-1850, at 284, 290 (1994).
27. PERKINS, supra note 26, at 288, 290.
28. 2 JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 234
(1965); S. S. HUEBNER ET AL., PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 18-19 (Prentice-Hall Inc. 1982) (1911); 1
TUAN, supra note 16, at 41-42.
29. 2 DAVIS, supra note 28, at 234-35.
30. MARY ELIZABETH RUWELL, EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CAPITALISM: THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN
MARINE INSURANCE COMPANIES 44 (1993).
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the chartering of insurance companies just before the beginning of the nineteenth
century. 32 The joint stock companies were organized for shareholder profit. The
companies raised capital through stock subscriptions, and their shareholders retained the
profits.
Mutual companies were another form of organization that became popular for
insurance companies. 3 3 They did not rely on capital stock subscriptions.34 Instead, their
capital was obtained from premiums paid by policyholders. 35 Mutual companies operated
on the principle that each insured person was a member of the company.3 6 The first
policies of mutual societies provided for any excess capital or dividends to be paid to
annuitants. Later, the policyholders in a mutual company divided profits from premium
investments among themselves. 37
A popular form of life insurance was the Tontine plan, named after Lorenzo Tonti,
the seventeenth-century Neapolitan financier who brought his scheme to the Court of
Versailles. 3 8 These plans generally provided an annual life income to subscribers who
lived beyond a specified date. 39 This was accomplished at the expense of the subscribers
who died earlier. At some specified future year, the remaining principal of the
contributing investors was divided among the survivors. 40 Such a scheme was used to
build New York's Tontine Coffee House-the center of commerce and stock trading for
several years after the American Revolution. 4 1
B. Insurance Company Growth in America
Twenty-three life insurance companies were "founded in America between 1812 and
1842."42 The great New York fire in 1835 bankrupted many of the privately owned fire
insurance companies in that city.43 Most of the remaining insurance companies in New
York City were rendered insolvent by the financial panic that occurred in 1837. 44
31. Id.
32. PERKINS, supra note 26, at 291; 2 DAVIS, supra note 28, at 244.
33. See ZELIZER, supra note 18, at 19.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. ANGELL, supra note 14, at 47-48; see ALEXANDER MACKIE, FACILE PRINCEPS: THE STORY OF THE
BEGINNING OF LIFE INSURANCE IN AMERICA 4 (1956) (giving an example of an early dividends clause);
ZELIZER, supra note 18, at 19 (describing mutual companies).
38. KEITH L. BRYANT, JR. & HENRY C. DETHLOFF, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN BUSINESS 200 (1983);
LAWRENCE B. GOODHEART, ABOLITIONIST, ACTUARY, ATHEIST: ELIZUR WRIGHT AND THE REFORM IMPULSE
168 (1990).
39. BRYANT & DETHLOFF, supra note 38, at 200; GOODHEART, supra note 38, at 168.
40. BRYANT & DETHLOFF, supra note 38, at 200; 2 DAVIS, supra note 28, at 70; GOODHEART, supra note
38, at 168.
41. THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE: THE FIRST 200 YEARS 21 (James E. Buck ed., 1992).
42. JOHN ROUSMANIERE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE EQUITABLE 18-19 (1995). In 1818, thirteen of the
twenty-nine securities traded on the New York Stock and Exchange Board were insurance companies. Joseph
Edward Hedges, Commercial Banking in the Stock Market Before 1863, in 56 THE JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 1,32 (1938).
43. ROUSMANIERE, supra note 42, at 19.
44. ANGELL, supra note 14, at 40-41; 1 ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS
1819-1947: THE PREDECESSOR FIRMS 1819-1906, at 21 (1948); 1 TUAN, supra note 16, at 47.
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Nevertheless, between 1840 and the outbreak of the Civil War, life insurance business in
America grew rapidly.4 5 Outstanding life insurance totaled $10 million in 1840.46 By
1860, $180 million of life insurance was in effect, as well as some $3 billion of fire and
marine insurance. 47 Almost thirty new insurance companies were created nationwide
between 1867 and 1869, bringing the total number of American insurance companies to
over one hundred.4 8 The amount of life insurance in force in the United States in 1865
nearly tripled its pre-war amount.
4 9
The insurance industry's success was also accompanied by some abuses. The
practice of loaning money to insurance company directors from premium reserves held to
pay beneficiary claims was one common problem. 50 In 1837, Massachusetts required
each insurance company to maintain a fund to assure that it could carry out its
contracts. 5 1 This was a reserve requirement or "unearned premium fund.
' 52
Massachusetts also strengthened its board of insurance commissioners and provided for
more expansive state supervision of life insurance.
53
In 1851, New York adopted a general insurance law. It restricted the investment
activities of mutual companies. 54 In 1853, the New York legislature added an unearned
premium reserve requirement.55 The New York law required a specific percentage of
unexpired premiums to be set aside to meet claims. 56 The New York Insurance
Department was created in 1859.
57
Insurance companies sold their products across state lines through networks of
"agents," a practice The Insurance Company of North America began as early as 1812,
which appointed agents outside of its Philadelphia headquarters to sell policies. 58 The
company set rates and accepted policies based on reports from agents. 59 Such agents
soon became a common feature of U.S. insurance companies.
60
Henry Hyde's Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States surpassed
Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York as the largest insurance company in
45. ALEX GRONER, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN BUSINESS & INDUSTRY 136 (Alvin
M. Josephy, Jr. ed., 1972).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. O'DONNELL, supra note 26, at 471.
49. ZELIZER, supra note 18, at 6.
50. See MACKIE, supra note 37, at 145.
51. 1 TUAN, supra note 16, at 48.
52. Id.
53. GOODHEART, supra note 38, at 147-48. A leading reformist, Elizur Wright, published policy valuation
tables in 1853 for insurance that could be used to set reserve requirements. He spent nine years preparing the
tables. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., 1996 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 130 (1996) [hereinafter LIFE INSURANCE
FACT BOOK].
54. 1 TUAN, supra note 16, at 48.
55. Id.
56. 1 id. at 48-49.
57. 1996 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 53, at 131. New Hampshire was the first state to create
a regulatory body to oversee insurance companies. Id. at 130.
58. BRYANT & DETHLOFF, supra note 38, at 201.
59. Id.
60. Id.; BRUCE MICHAEL PRITCHETT, A STUDY OF CAPITAL MOBILIZATION: THE LIFE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 21 (rev. ed. 1977).
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America in 1889.61 Hyde took the name of "Equitable" from an English company
founded in 1762, the Society for Equitable Assurances on Lives and Survivorships. 62
Hyde is credited with introducing aggressive sales practices in the insurance industry
through his "army" of insurance agents.63
Efforts to regulate insurance at the federal level in the late 1860s were
unsuccessful. 64 In Paul v. Virginia,65 the United States Supreme Court held that
insurance was not interstate commerce and could be regulated by the states as if it were
an entirely local business.66 In 1886, the Supreme Court again held that the issuance of a
policy of insurance was not a transaction in interstate commerce that was excluded from
local regulation and presumably subject to federal regulation. 67 This holding meant that
insurance was not subject to federal regulation and that states could regulate such
business within their own borders. The states gradually expanded their regulation, and the
insurance companies then tried to obtain federal legislation that would preempt state
jurisdiction.6 8 Those efforts failed.
Congress passed the National Bank Act (NBA)69 during the Civil War. Because the
Supreme Court held that insurance was not interstate commerce, the NBA created a
national charter option for banks which were previously all chartered by the states.7 0 It
was believed that a tax on state bank notes that was introduced as part of the NBA would
drive state banks to convert to national bank charters.7 1 State banks, however, responded
by replacing their state bank notes with a relatively new product, checking accounts,
which were not subject to the onerous state bank note tax.72 Thus, the creation of the dual
chartering system was largely a historical accident.
C. The Armstrong Investigation
Between 1870 and 1905, the amount of life insurance issued in the United States
increased by almost six-hundred percent.73 Insurance companies were a growing force in
finance. They poured vast amounts of funds into the securities markets. Those funds were
generated by large cash flows from premiums and held in reserve to pay policy claims.
61. ROUSMANIERE, supra note 42, at 3.
62. PRITCHETT, supra note 60, at 24-26; ROUSMANIERE, supra note 42, at 19. Another growing giant was
the Prudential Insurance Company, a descendant of the Widows and Orphans' Friendly Society. BRYANT &
DETHLOFF, supra note 38, at 207.
63. Douglass North, Capital Accumulation in Life Insurance Between the Civil War and the Investigation
of 1905, in MEN IN BUSINESS: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE ENTREPRENEUR 244-46 (Torchbook
ed., Harper & Row 1962) (1952).
64. See MORTON KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 1885-1910, at 8 (1963).
65. 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
66. Id. at 183-85.
67. Fire Ass'n of Phila. v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 119-20 (1886); see also I SWAINE, supra note 44, at
225.
68. 1 R. CARLYLE BULEY, THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1859-
1964, at 597-98 (1967).
69. 12 Stat. 665 (1863). See Carol Conjura, Independent Bankers Association v. Conover: Nonbank Banks
AreNot in the Business of Banking, 35 Am. U.L. Rev. 429, 437 n.32 (1986) (giving a brief history of the Act).
70. 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1994).
71. JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION II (2d ed. 1997).
72. Id.
73. North, supra note 63, at 238.
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Life insurance companies had traditionally invested their assets in a conservative manner.
Common stocks accounted for about two percent of the assets held by insurance
companies between 1860 and 1880. 74 After 1890, life insurance companies began to
participate more broadly in the securities markets.
75
The growing reserves of insurance companies provided them with a great deal of
economic power which engendered criticism. Louis D. Brandeis, a future United States
Supreme Court Justice, stated in 1905 that insurance companies were "the greatest
economic menace of today" and that as "creditors of [the] great industries," they used
their power "selfishly, dishonestly [and] inefficiently." 76 Brandeis's criticism would be
given credence by events unfolding at the Equitable Life Assurance Company where
twenty-three year old James Hyde had succeeded his father. James Hyde was given to
ostentatious displays of his wealth that marked him as a less-than-serious businessman.
7 7
Hyde's excesses and other industry problems sparked so much criticism that the New
York Superintendent of Insurance initiated an investigation of the insurance industry.
78
That investigation led the New York legislature to appoint an investigating committee
headed by Senator William W. Armstrong.79 The Committee was charged with
undertaking a broad review of the activities of New York insurance companies. 80 Charles
Evan Hughes, a future Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, acted as the
Armstrong Committee's counsel.
81
Ultimately, the Armstrong Committee concluded that insurance companies were a
part of the trend toward the accumulation of great capital by a few individuals and
enterprises. The Committee stated, "No tendency in modem financial conditions has
created more widespread apprehension than the tendency to vast combinations of capital
74. RAYMOND W. GOLDSMITH, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN CORPORATE STOCK-A BACKGROUND
STUDY 56 (1973).
75. Id.; JOHN A. KOUWENHOVEN, PARTNERS IN BANKING, AN HISTORICAL PORTRAIT OF A GREAT
PRIVATE BANK, BROWN BROTHERS HARRIMAN & Co. 1818-1968, at 169 (1968); JOHN MOODY, THE MASTERS
OF CAPITAL: A CHRONICLE OF WALL STREET 118-19, 126 (1919); see North, supra note 63, at 239 & 367 n.7
(describing growth of insurance companies and their expanded investments).
76. KELLER, supra note 64, at 32. Brandeis was the advocate of a proposal to sell life insurance through
mutual savings banks in Massachusetts. Michael D. White, What Will It Take for Bank Insurance to Succeed in
the United States?, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 123, 124 (1998). That proposal followed revelations of the
Armstrong investigation, which indicated that insurance companies were maintaining "scandalously high
premiums and commissions and low policy values and retention rates." Id. Massachusetts enacted legislation in
1907 that allowed mutual savings banks to provide life insurance and annuity policies. S.S. HUEBNER &
KENNETH BLACK, JR., LIFE INSURANCE 558 (10th ed. 1982). New York and Connecticut adopted similar
legislation in later years. Id. Those laws limited the insurance that could be written by the savings banks to
small amounts. Id. at 560.
77. JOHN A. GARRATY, RIGHT-HAND MAN: THE LIFE OF GEORGE W. PERKINS 161-62 (1960); see also
ROUSMANIERE, supra note 42, at 92-93 (finding that Hyde became the subject of criticism after supposedly
hosting a $20,000 dinner).
78. GARRATY, supra note 77, at 162.
79. Id. at 163.
80. See id.; see also H. PEERS BREWER, THE EMERGENCE OF THE TRUST COMPANY IN NEW YORK CITY,
1870-1900, at 282 (1986) (stating that the Armstrong Committee is an example of an early twentieth century
"trust buster").
81. GARRATY, supra note 77, at 164; MARGARET G. MYERS, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 252 (1970).
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and assets." 82 Another matter of concern for the Armstrong Committee was that the large
reserves held by the insurance companies were increasingly being invested in the stock
market. The Armstrong Committee recommended the prohibition of insurance
companies' investment in stocks because such investment endangered the companies'
reserves. 83 The New York legislature, thereafter, restricted the ability of insurance
companies to invest in common stocks. 84 Another reform required insurance companies
to divest themselves of bank stocks. Insurance companies were prohibited from acting as
underwriters for securities or engaging in securities syndications.85 The restrictions
imposed by New York and other states on insurance company investments shut off a
large source of funds for Wall Street.86
After the Armstrong investigation, insurance companies initially engaged in some
"agitation" for federal regulation in order to avoid multiple state regulation. 87 The
industry soon took the view, however, that state regulation was preferable to federal
regulation. The industry then contended that its business was not a part of interstate
commerce. Hence, it could not be regulated by Congress and was not subject to the
antitrust laws. This argument proved persuasive, and the insurance industry avoided
federal legislation and resumed its growth.88
Federal legislation in the banking arena increased during this period. Congress
enacted the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, creating the Federal Reserve System.89 The
regional Federal Reserve Banks were to serve as lenders of last resort and help to avoid
financial panics such as the Panic of 1907, which was softened only by the intervention
of the financier J.P. Morgan.90
D. The Depression
Many insurance companies experienced difficulties during the Great Depression.
Over 130 insurance companies were forced to borrow a total of over $90 million from the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC).9 1 The Depression had other effects on the
industry. Insurance companies suffered large losses on many of their investments. 92
Returns dropped as insurance companies concentrated their investments in low interest
82. TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITrEE, 76TH CONG., 3D SESS., INVESTIGATION OF
CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER, MONOGRAPH NO. 28, at 7 (GPO 1940) [hereinafter MONOGRAPH NO.
28] (quoting 10 ARMSTRONG REPORT 389 (1906)).
83. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 74, at 56; TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 76TH CONG.
3D SESS., INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER, MONOGRAPH NO. 28-A, at 4 (GPO 1941)
[hereinafter MONOGRAPH NO. 28-A].
84. Monograph No. 28-A, supra note 83, at 4.
85. See LIFE INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES AS FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 76 (1963).
86. MOODY, supra note 75, at 132; ROUSMANIERE, supra note 42, at 112.
87. See KELLER, supra note 64, at 263.
88. 1 SWAINE, supra note 44, at 754-55.
89. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
90. JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN AMERICAN FINANCIER 574-93 (1999).
91. JESSE H. JONES WITH EDWARD ANGLY, FIFTY BILLION DOLLARS: MY THIRTEEN YEARS WITH THE
RFC (1932-1945) 206 (1951).
92. CLOUGH, supra note 18, at 240-41.
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paying government securities.93 Insurance companies also experienced runs on their
assets because hard-pressed policyholders sought to obtain the surrender value of their
policies. Several states adopted legislation that froze surrender claims.
94
Despite these difficulties, Congress did not seek to regulate the insurance industry as
it did the securities, banking, and futures industries. 95 The legislation resulting from the
Armstrong investigation removed insurance companies from speculation in stock
markets. This sheltered the insurance companies from many of the speculative excesses
of the 1920s and kept them out of the line of fire of congressional investigations that
focused on financiers in other areas of the economy.
The insurance industry, however, did not entirely escape scrutiny. Just before World
War II, Franklin Roosevelt created the Temporary National Economic Committee
(TNEC) to study the concentration of economic power in the United States. The Federal
Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Department
of Justice conducted this study.9 6 Joseph O'Mahoney, a senator from Wyoming, was the
Chairman of the committee. 97 One area of concern was the insurance industry, which had
steadily accumulated enormous reserves. TNEC considered a proposal from the SEC that
would establish a new federal regulatory body to oversee insurance companies.
9 8
Insurance companies vigorously opposed such a course, pointing out that both
Democratic and Republican Party platforms had pledged that supervision of insurance
companies would be left to the states. 99 As a result, TNEC rejected the SEC proposal,
and the insurance industry again escaped federal regulation.
TNEC found that the assets of life insurance companies had increased by over eight
hundred percent between 1906 and 1938.100 Reserves of insurance companies had grown
so much that they had national implications for investment and capital flow. TNEC
noted, "The investment policies and practices of the legal reserve life insurance
companies admittedly influence practically every phase of this country's economic
life." 10 1 The largest insurance companies in the United States had around $28 billion to
93. Id. at 245.
94. 2 BULEY, supra note 68, at 996-97 & n.26.; CLOUGH, supra note 18, at 240-41.
95. For bankers, the Banking Act of 1933 created the FDIC and a system of deposit insurance that was
mandatory for national banks and state banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. §
1811 (1994). The second significant aspect of the Banking Act was the so called Glass-Steagall Act, composed
of four sections of the Banking Act, that attempted to separate banking and securities activities. See Banking
Act of 1933 § 16, 12 U.S.C. § 24(seventh) (1994) (revised 1999); Id. § 20, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994) (repealed
1999); Id. § 21, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1994); Id. § 32, 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1994) (repealed 1999).
For securities firms, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 set forth the
structure for federal regulation of securities that continues today. DAVID L. RATNER & THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (5th ed. 1996). For the futures industry, the Commodity
Exchange Act of 1936 sets forth the structure for regulation of exchange traded futures and commodity options.
JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS REGULATION 27 (1987).
96. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 209 (rev. ed., Northeastern U. Press 1995)
(1982).
97. MYERS, supra note 81, at 335.
98. MONOGRAPH NO. 28-A, supra note 83, at 20-21.
99. Id.
100. MONOGRAPH No. 28, supra note 82, at 9.
101. Id. at 342.
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invest between 1929 and 1938.102 In 1930, life insurance companies held about two
percent of their assets in industrial and other bonds, and they held twenty-four percent in
railroad and public utility bonds. 103 In addition, government securities accounted for
substantial portions of life insurance company investments. 104 In 1937, the twenty-six
largest insurance companies owned over eleven percent of the long-term debt of the
United States government, as well as large percentages of long-term private debt and well
over $1.5 billion of real estate. 10 5 Large life insurance companies had over $10 million to
invest each day. 106 Yet, life insurance companies only invested small amounts in equity
securities. 107 The great bulk of insurance companies' investments in securities were in
bonds rather than stocks. 108
TNEC concluded that the increasing amount of reserves being accumulated by life
insurance companies was "in effect sterilizing the savings funds received and preventing
them from flowing into new enterprises or undertakings where the element of venture or
risk is present. Thus the small businessman or average industrialist is denied access to
this more important capital reservoir." 10 9 Insurance companies were trying to make their
investments "riskless." In fact, their demand for bonds made corporate investments even
more risky because the demand placed increased pressure on companies to issue more
debt, thereby unbalancing debt-to-equity ratios. Furthermore, bidding by insurance
companies for the supply of bonds drove interest rates down and reduced the rate of
return for their holders.1 10
TNEC also noted that the emphasis on bond investment by insurance companies
would create difficulties "[u]nless the life insurance companies can find methods by
which the funds flowing from their control will become available as equity for the
stimulation of new enterprises and accessible to small- and medium-sized
businessmen."1 11 The Committee thought that insurance companies should increase their
investments in common stocks "in order that industrial enterprise may not become
overburdened with debt." 112 The insurance companies, however, were handicapped in
their ability to buy common stocks.1 13 State insurance laws adopted in the wake of the
Armstrong investigation restricted the ability of insurance companies to invest in such
securities.
Moreover, insurance companies had come to accept these restrictions and were
willing to accept a lower return on their investments because their assets were at less risk.
Insurance companies claimed that their safety record was "without parallel,
notwithstanding the worst depression in modem history." 114 They noted that their
102. Id.
103. HAROLD G. VATTER, THE U.S. ECONOMY IN THE 1950s: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 194 (1963).
104. MONOGRAPH NO. 28, supra note 82, at 343.
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id. at 7.
107. Id. at 6-7.
108. Id. at 343.
109. MONOGRAPH No. 28, supra note 82, at 378.
110. Id. at377-78.
111. Id. at 378.
112. Id.
113. MONOGRAPH No. 28-A, supra note 83, at 3-5.
114. Id. at 5.
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avoidance of equity investments had prevented the insurance industry from being
devastated by the stock market crash of 1929. "Happily, the disaster which might
otherwise have occurred was avoided."
1 15
Although the insurance industry suffered during the Great Depression, the 70
million life insurance policies in effect in 1933116 grew to over 124 million in 1940, with
an outstanding face amount of over $110 billion.1 17 Those policies were issued by over
three hundred life insurance companies, with assets exceeding $28 billion. 118 "Legal
reserve life insurance companies"1 19 dominated the insurance business by 1940, writing
about ninety-five percent of life insurance policies. 120 Fraternal orders and assessment
societies wrote the remaining five percent. 12 1 State laws required legal reserve life
insurance companies to maintain a reserve for their policies "based on the type of
contract, age of issue, and mortality and interest assumptions involved."122 Numerous
variations in life insurance were available by the outbreak of World War II, including
whole life, 123 endowment, 12 4 and term.125 One insurance company offered some 130
varieties of policies, however, whole life policies predominated in 1940.126
Annuities became popular during the Depression. 127 The number of annuities being
sold increased heavily in 1933.128 Total annuity premiums in 1935 exceeded all
premiums from 1866 to 1927.129 In fact, during the period from 1933 to 1937, the total
premium income from annuity contracts was $1.7 billion. 130 Reserves for annuity
contracts rose from some $400 million in 1929 to $2.6 billion in 1938.131
115. Id.at4.
116. CROBAUGH, supra note 9, at preface.
117. MONOGRAPH NO. 28, supra note 82, at 5.
118. Id.
119. A "legal reserve life insurance company" is one that sells insurance to the general public. By law such
companies are required to set aside a portion of their premium receipts as a reserve to meet policyholders'
claims.
120. MONOGRAPH No. 28, supra note 82, at 5 n.l.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. A "whole life policy" is one that has a level premium payment over the life of the policy. The insured
is covered throughout her life as long as the premiums are paid. It provides a guaranteed death benefit. Cash
value accumulates in the policy over time. See generally, Ed Townsend, Life Insurance-How Much, What
Kind Do You Need?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 22, 1982, at BI3.
124. An "endowment policy" is one written for the benefit of a particular entity. Id. However, the insured
may receive the face value of the policy if he survives the endowment period. Ho Sheo Be, Different Policies
Available, STRAIGHTS TIMEs, Oct. 15, 1993, Life, at 2.
125. Term insurance covers only a particular period of time. Premium costs will increase as the insured
grows older. Townsend, supra note 123, at B13.
126. MONOGRAPH NO. 28, supra note 82, at 178.
127. See id. at 154 (finding that "[c]ompanies first started writing annuities on a large scale in 1927").
Annuities seek to assure that the insured does not outlive his 7estate by guaranteeing payments for life. In
contrast, life insurance seeks to create an estate at death that will provide benefits to the insured's survivors. See
generally, Ho Sheo Be, supra note 124, Life, at 2.
128. MONOGRAPH No. 28, supra note 82, at 154.
129. Id. at 329.
130. Id. at 154.
131. MONOGRAPH NO. 28, supra note 82, at 154, 328.
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E. A Regulatory Threat Arises
From March 1933 to October 1938, the principal United States and Canadian
insurance companies held conferences at the offices of Dr. Arthur Hunter, Chief Actuary
and Vice President of the New York Life Insurance Company. 132 The insurance
companies established a uniform program for annuity rates and policy terms at those
meetings, essentially fixing prices. 13 3 In 1944, the Supreme Court in United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass 'n,134 held that insurance companies were subject to the
federal antitrust laws. 13 5 In South-Eastern Underwriters, two hundred insurance
companies were charged with violating the Sherman Antitrust Act by joining the South-
Eastern Underwriters Association. 136 The purpose of this association was to control the
fire insurance business and to discriminate and retaliate against insurance companies that
were not members of the association. 137 After the Supreme Court's decision, insurance
companies became concerned that they would not be able to pool their loss statistics or be
able to jointly compute actuarially sound premiums. 138 States were concerned that
federal antitrust laws would preempt state regulation. 139 Some insurance companies
refused to comply with state insurance laws on that ground. 140 Congress responded to
those concerns by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945.141 This Act granted
insurance companies immunity from federal antitrust laws to the extent they were
regulated by state law. 142 The Act largely exempted the insurance industry, as it was then
constituted, from federal regulation, a regulatory approach diametrically opposite to the
regulatory structure for the securities industry. Regulation of securities was subject to
shared control by the federal government and states, but the federal government had
overriding authority for regulation. 143 Only in future years, when insurance companies
started selling securities-like products, would there be an effort to reassert federal control
over the securities-like activities of insurance companies. State dominated regulation was
also at odds with the federal regulation already imposed on all banks-even those with a
state charter.
F. Post- War Growth
In June of 1952, some $265 billion in face value of life insurance was outstanding in
the United States. 14 4 Insurance companies doubled their assets between 1945 and 1955
132. Id. at 155.
133. Id. at 154-57.
134. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
135. Id. at 560-61.
136. Id. at 535-36.
137. Id.
138. Note, Federal Regulation of Insurance Companies: The Disappearing McCarran Act Exemption, 1973
DUKE L.J. 1340, 1341 (1973).
139. Id.
140. Id.; Note, Qualified Immunity For Insurers Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 46 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 396, 398 (1978).
141. 59 Stat. 33, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015(1994).
142. 15U.S.C. § 1012(b)(1994).
143. 1 Thomas Lee Hazen, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 6-8 (2d ed. 1990).
144. MYERS, supra note 81, at 390.
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and invested large amounts of their reserves in industrial and commercial buildings. 1
4 5
Other insurance company investments in the 1950s included farm loans, city property
loans, and government securities issued in the United States and by foreign governments.
Insurance companies were involved in the home mortgage market and made term loans to
corporations in competition with banks. 146 Life insurance companies remained the largest
single lender in the corporate bond market.14 7 In the early 1950s, insurance companies
held about fifteen percent of their assets in industrial bonds and about five percent in
railroad bonds.148 Public utility bonds comprised another significant portion of life
insurance company assets. 14 9 Insurance companies increased their investments in
common stock as state law restrictions on such investments were eased. 150
A new product, the variable annuity, was introduced in 1952 to teachers by the
College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), which was affiliated with the Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA). 15 1 Under the traditional "fixed" annuity,
purchasers received a fixed amount of income based on their premium payments, life
expectancy, and an assumed rate of return on the premium payments. The insurance
company had to bear the risk that purchasers would live longer than expected and that
returns on the investment of premiums might be less than projected. In contrast, the
variable annuity operated much like a mutual fund. Annuity premiums were invested in
securities, and the performance of those investments determined the amount of the
income from the variable annuity rather than the assumed interest rate used for the fixed
annuity. The purchaser of a variable annuity incurred the risk that investment returns
might be less than expected. Returns could also be higher than those of a fixed annuity if
the investment of variable annuity premiums exceeded the rates assumed for the return on
the fixed annuity.
During the 1950s, creation of the variable annuity represented an effort by the
insurance industry to take advantage of investor interest in the rising stock market. The
insurance industry wanted a product to compete with mutual funds. The variable annuity
filled that role. Indeed, the variable annuity was itself held to be a security by the
Supreme Court in 1959.152 This meant that variable annuities were subject to regulation
by the SEC under federal securities laws. This ruling signaled the start of a functional
regulatory approach, as well as the beginning of a struggle that continues today over the
integration of the insurance and securities industries.
In SEC v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co., 15 3 the Supreme Court again held that
an annuity contract, which provided a market-based return, was subject to federal
145. Id.; Harry T. Rohs, For-Rent Capital Is Running Low, Say Life Insurance Firm, WALL ST. J., April 2,
1951, at 1; Harry T. Rohs, Investing Frontier, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1948, at 1.
146. MARCUS NADLER ET AL., THE MONEY MARKET AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 120 (1955); Life Insurance
Company Investments, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1950, at 2.
147. VATrER, supra note 103, at 195.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. G. KEITH FuNSTON, WANTED: MORE OWNERS OF AMERICAN BUSINESS 11 (1954).
151. CEDRIC V. FRICKE, THE VARIABLE ANNUITY, ITS IMPACT ON THE SAVINGS-INVESTMENT MARKET 2
(1959).
152. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 71-72 (1959).
153. 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
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securities laws. 154 In United Benefit, the insurer had tried to avoid that regulation by
assuming some of the investment risks in the contract through a guarantee of a minimum
return after the accumulation phase of the contract. 155 Returns to the investor, however,
were also subject to market performance. 156 The Supreme Court held this was sufficient
to make the contract a security. 157 As a result, insurance companies were subject to state
insurance regulations as well as state and federal securities regulations. Insurance
companies were required to separate their variable products from their traditional
insurance products. Reserves to support traditional products were kept in the insurance
company's general account. So-called "separate" accounts had to be established for
variable securities products. 158
G. More Growth
"Between 1945 and 1960 assets of life insurance companies tripled."15 9 By 1965,
assets of life insurance companies totaled almost $160 billion. 160 Those holdings were
invested largely in mortgages, corporate bonds, and government securities. New York
still limited the common stock holdings of life insurance companies to five percent of
their total assets. 16 1
The states created their own insurance guaranty fund system to cut off a proposed
federal program of insurance designed to protect policyholders in the event of an
insurance company's insolvency. 162 Between 1969 and 1980, state guaranty funds made
assessments for property and casualty insurance of about $200 million. 163 Sixty-seven
insurance companies failed during that period.164 The state guaranty funds were small,
however, and could not handle a major default. 165
In the 1960s, the insurance industry began a series of mergers and acquisitions that
sometimes involved noninsurance businesses. 166 In response to this trend, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) approved a model insurance holding
154. Id. at 211-12.
155. Id. at 208.
156. Id. at 210-11.
157. Id.
158. For a discussion of litigation attempting to characterize insurance products as securities, see generally
Jeffery S. Puretz, Federal Securities Regulation of Insurance Products, 799 PLI/CoMM. 459 (Order No. AOO-
003V) (2000). The insurance industry engaged in an extended quarrel with the SEC over the regulation of
variable insurance products. The SEC, under Chairman William Casey, granted an exemption from registration
in 1973 for those variable insurance products, but subsequently revoked it. ROUSMANIERE, supra note 42, at
251. Later, the SEC and the insurance industry reached an accommodation that allowed these products to be
sold without undue interference. Id. For a discussion of SEC treatment of separate accounts, see generally
Puretz, supra, at 479 (finding that the SEC focuses on mortality risk as distinguishing insurance from
securities).
159. MARTIN MAYER, THE BANKERS 190 (1974).
160. MYERS, supra note 81, at 390.
161. SIDNEY ROBBINS, THE SECURITIES MARKETS: OPERATIONS AND ISSUES 219-20 (1966).
162. 2 JANE W. D'ARISTA, THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. FINANCE: RESTRUCTURING INSTITUTIONS AND
MARKETS 370 (1994).
163. 2 id. at 372.
164. 2 id.
165. 2 id. at 359.
166. 2 id. at 72.
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company statute that was adopted by most states. 167 This legislation imposed restrictions
on companies seeking to acquire insurance companies.16 8 Under the model act, insurance
holding companies were allowed to manage mutual funds, to sell variable annuities and
life insurance, and to act as broker-dealers for their own accounts, but not for the
public. 169 Insurance companies and their affiliates were allowed to manage pension
funds.170 The restrictions on insurance holding company activities were similar to the
restrictions on bank holding company activities under the Bank Holding Company Act
(BHCA) of 1956.171 The BHCA empowered the FRB to oversee the activities of a
holding company and its nonbanking subsidiaries. 172 The BHCA provided federal
regulation for bank holding companies; the model insurance holding company statute
provided for regulation of insurance holding companies at the state level.
By the 1970s, insurance companies managed about half of all pension funds.
173
Bonds were still the largest type of investment by life insurance companies in the 1970s,
and many corporations placed debt through private placements with insurance
companies. Indeed, insurance companies accounted for about seventy-five percent of all
direct placements, and direct placements accounted for as much as one-half of total long-
term corporate financing. 17
4
Insurance companies continued to lose market share in the 1970s to mutual funds,
even with the creation of variable annuities. 1 7 5 Sales of whole life insurance policies had
long been popular as a savings program. In the 1970s, however, sales began declining
because of reduced investment returns and the high interest rates available elsewhere. 176
Increased interest rates made it more difficult to sell whole life policies that provided low
rates of return to policyholders. Instead, policyholders chose term insurance which was
relatively cheap in the early years of the insured's life. This change reduced the premium
income of life insurance companies. In addition, whole life holders borrowed on their
existing policies at below-market interest rates which further undercut the insurance
companies' returns. 177 Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, life insurance was far
from dead. By 1983, eighty-six percent of Americans owned life insurance. 178 Some two
thousand life insurance companies were operating in the middle of that decade.
179
Life insurance companies offered guaranteed interest contracts (GICs). 180 These
contracts, similar to annuity contracts, were used to fund pension plans or to terminate
167. 2 D'ARISTA, supra note 162, at 72. The NAIC is a private trade association of state insurance
commissioners.
168. 2id.
169. 2 id.
170. See2 id.
171. 2 id. at 68.
172. 2 D'ARISTA, supra note 162, at 72; 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1848a (1994)
173. 2 D'ARISTA, supra note 162, at 72.
174. HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 76, at 606-07.
175. ROUsMANIERE, supra note 42, at 243-44.
176. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, BUFFETr: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN CAPITALIST 237 (1995). Rising
interest rates devalued insurance companies' bond portfolios. Insurance firms thus were reluctant to sell those
bonds because they would have to realize a loss. Id.
177. MARTIN H. WOLFSON, FINANCIAL CRISES 66 (1994).
178. 2 D'ARISTA, supra note 162, at 387 n.16.
179. 2 id.
180. See Rousmaniere, supra note 42, at 263.
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coverage of benefit plans. 18 1 By 1990, those contracts resulted in huge losses to
insurance companies. 182 Banks responded by offering bank investment contracts
(BICs). 183
The U.S. insurance industry, unlike other financial service sectors, continued to be
regulated only at the state level, except for discrete products that were considered
securities and regulated as securities. In 1988, Congress began hearings to determine
whether federal regulation was needed, but no legislation resulted. After forty multi-state
insurance companies failed in 1992, the Federal Insurance Solvency Act (FISA) was
introduced. It sought to create a Federal Insurance Solvency Commission (FISC) that
would establish national standards for financial soundness and solvency of insurance
companies. The legislation was beaten back by the industry and state insurance
administrators. 18 4
In lieu of a federal regulator, the NAIC serves as a coordinator of state insurance
regulation and registration examinations. 185 NAIC drafted model laws, but, as a
voluntary organization, it could not compel state legislatures to adopt model acts or
regulations. 186 Most states, for example, did not require independent audits or reviews of
actuaries in setting reserves. International reinsurance issues were also outside the
jurisdiction of this organization. 187 NAIC did, however, create a joint reporting and
surveillance system for large interstate insurance companies. 188
NAIC had only minor enforcement power, which on occasion it did exercise. For
example in 1993, it suspended New York's accreditation in the association because New
York had failed to enact NAIC model legislation.189 NAIC also established an "Insurance
Regulatory Information System" that created risk profiles to determine whether an
insurance company's financial condition was deteriorating. 190 The system proved to be
unsuccessful. Finally, NAIC sought to further its testing of the adequacy of insurance
company reserves by creating risk-based capital tests. 19 1
181. 2 D'ARISTA, supra note 162, at 317.
182. See ROUSMANIERE, supra note 42, at 269, 302 (implying that the contracts resulted in huge losses).
183. Glennie v. Abitibi-Price Corp., 912 F. Supp. 933, 996 n.1 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (describing BICs and
GICS). Bank regulators removed deposit insurance for BICs. Accounts Held By a Depository Institution as the
Trustee of an Irrevocable Trust, 12 C.F.R. § 330.12 (2000); see DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REPORT,
MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS 24
(1995).
184. See John L. Ingersoll et al., Federal Regulation of Insurance, 23 SPG BRIEF 10 (Spring 1994); see also
Scot J. Paltrow, The Converted: How Insurance Firms Beat Back an Effort For Stricter Controls, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 5, 1998, at Al (commenting on how state regulators strengthened NAIC in order to preempt federal
regulation).
185. 2 D'ARSTA, supra note 162, at 304.
186. 2 id. at 304-05.
187. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 101ST
CONG., FAILED PROMISES: INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCIEs 63 (1990) [hereinafter FAILED PROMISES].
188. 2 D'ARISTA, supra note 162, at 304.
189. 2id.at305.
190. 2 id.
191. See Robert W. Stein, It's Time to Reengineer the Regulatory System (Life and Health Insurers),
BEST'S REVIEW- LIFE/HEALTH INS. ED., Feb. 1995, at 62.
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Before 1992, most states had capital requirements based on static minimum amounts
of capital and surplus.192 Risk-based capital standards changed this to require capital
levels premised on the risk of the investments in an insurance company's portfolio.
193
Insurance guaranty funds, created by the states, were generally small in amount.
19 4
Between 1969 and 1990, more than 150 property-casualty companies failed. 195 Seventy-
five of those failures were between 1985 and 1990.196 State insurance funds proved to be
inadequate in the crisis. By 1985, twenty-one large insurance companies had been
liquidated. 197 In 1988, state regulators assumed control of thirteen life insurance
companies, thirty-two in 1990, and thirty-four in the first nine months of 1991.198
Insurance company failures in the 1980s resulted in losses estimated at $10 billion. 199
Sales practices became another burgeoning problem. The Phoenix Home Life
Mutual Insurance Company in New York settled a class action for $100 million.200
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company entered into a settlement expected to cost
$35 million and cover 130,000 policyholders. 20 1 MetLife, the second largest insurance
company in the United States, was required to pay $100 million in Florida for sales
abuses. 20 2 Later, MetLife agreed to settle other lawsuits in connection with deceptive
practices in its insurance sales. These settlements reportedly could cost the company as
much as $1.7 billion. 20 3 John Hancock Life Insurance Company conceded it was
negotiating a class-action settlement for as much as $100 million20 4 and paid Florida
regulators $6 million to settle abusive sales practices charges.20 5
Even the venerable Prudential Insurance Company of America came under attack
for its sales practices. Class actions were brought charging that thousands of Prudential
policyholders were defrauded by agents who churned the sale of whole life policies to
generate commissions and who misled customers about "vanishing premium" policies.
20 6
By 1999, Prudential had paid out more than $1 billion to 250,000 policyholders in the
192. Larry G. Mayewski et al., RBC: Beauty Contest or Non-Event? Risk-Based Capital Regulation,
BEST'S REVIEW- LIFE/HEALTH INS. ED., Mar. 1994, at 33, 34.
193. Id. at 34.
194. 2 D'ARISTA, supra note 162, at 359-60; ALAN GART, REGULATION, DEREGULATION, REREGULATION:
THE FUTURE OF THE BANKING, INSURANCE, AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 215 (1994).
195. 2id.
196. 2 id.
197. 2id.
198. 2id.
199. KENNETH D. MYERS, FALSE SECURITY, GREED & DECEPTION IN AMERICA'S MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 22-23 (1995); see also FAILED PROMISES, supra note 187, at 2.
200. Ron Panko, Fallout From the Market Conduct Bomb Penetrates Life Industry; Allegedly Deceptive
Sales Practices, BEST'S REVIEW - LIFE/HEALTH INS. ED., Dec. 1996, at 46, 47.
201. Id. at 47.
202. MYERS, supra note 199, at 200.
203. Barry Meier, Metropolitan Life in Accordfor Settlement of Fraud Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1999, at
Al; Court Approves MetLife Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1999, at C I.
204. Larry Light & Geoffrey Smith, Brushing the Cobwebs Off John Hancock, BUS. WK., June 2, 1997, at
123.
205. Jeff Harrington, MetLife Settles Florida Charges, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 4, 2000, at IE.
American General also paid $5.5 million as settlement for its allegedly improper sales activities. Id.
206. Deborah Lohse, Suits Settled by Prudential for $62 Million, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1999, at C I.
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class action.20 7 This amount covered only forty percent of the claimants. 20 8 Prudential
set aside a total of $2.6 billion to settle these claims. 209 Prudential agreed to settle its life
insurance regulatory problems through a multi-state settlement under which it paid a $35
million fine, the largest penalty ever imposed on an insurance company. Prudential had
also agreed to settle its limited partnership claims at a cost of about $1.5 billion. 2 10 These
and other problems resulted in a reduction in Prudential's credit rating by Standard &
Poor's.2 11
Despite all of these troubles, the assets of U.S. life insurance companies reached
astronomical levels. By 1982, insurance companies had assets of $700 billion, which was
more than the value of the assets of the nation's top fifty corporations combined.2 12 The
insurance industry had assets of $1.75 trillion in 1988.213 That figure hit $2.1 trillion in
1995.214 At the same time, the mix of investments held by insurance companies was
changing. For example, mortgage holdings were 9.9% of industry assets in 1995, the
lowest percentage since record keeping began in 1890.215 In 1998, Kentucky and
Minnesota allowed life insurers to invest up to twenty percent of their assets in common
stock.2 16 The limit was ten percent in Arkansas, Ohio, and Indiana. 2 17
In 1992, two of every three adults and nine out of ten households had some form of
life insurance.2 18 The total life insurance in force in 1995 was at a record level.2 19 The
average amount of life insurance per household was $124,100. 22°The product base for
life insurance companies began to change during this period as insurance companies
began to sell "universal" insurance products. These products provided more flexibility
than traditional whole life policies. Universal life insurance sought to unbundle life
insurance mortality costs from the interest credited on policy values and expense
charges. 22 1 This allowed the policyholder to change death benefits and "to vary the
207. Deborah Lohse, Prudential Has Paid Out Over $1 Billion to Policyholders So Far in Class Action,
WALL ST. J., June 7, 1999, at B3.
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. Alison Rea & Leah Nathans Spiro, Can Art Ryan Move "The Rock'?, Bus. WK., Aug. 5, 1996, at 70;
see also KURT EICHENWALD, SERPENT ON THE ROCK 431 (1995) (describing the regulatory problem Prudential
faced).
211. Scott J. Paltrow & Leslie Schism, Prudential Faces Court Date in Appeal of Class Settlement Over
Sales Practices, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 1998, at AIO.
212. Big on Profits, Low on Returns - Insurance Says Andrew Tobias, Is America 's Protection Racket,
PEOPLE MAG., Apr. 12, 1982, at 77.
213. FAILED PROMISES, supra note 187, at 7.
214. Id.
215. 1996 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 53, at 7.
216. Barbara Bowers, Watching the Bulls Roar By, BEST'S REVIEW - LIFE/HEALTH INS. ED., Oct. 1998, at
37, 38.
217. Id.
218. By 1996, 67% of adult Americans owned life insurance, and 154 million Americans were covered by
some form of life insurance. 1996 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 53, at 6.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. GARY SCHULTE, THE FALL OF FIRST EXECUTIVE: THE HOUSE THAT FRED CARR BUILT 46 (1991).
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amount or timing of premium payments." 222 Universal life insurance accounted for
thirty-eight percent of the industry's premiums by 1985.223
Another new product, variable life insurance, provided life insurance, but death
benefits and cash value of the policy were based on the market performance of
investments maintained in a separate account by the insurance company. The policy
owner had a variety of investment choices in the separate account, including mutual
funds with a broad range of investment objectives. This scheme provided an opportunity
for a greater return than that available on traditional whole life policies. Coverage from
such products increased from about $6.8 billion in 1985 to $83.6 billion in 1995.224
Some 110 insurance companies offered over 260 different variable annuity products in
1998.225 By 1995, about 12.8 million individuals had variable annuity plans.
2 26
The advantage of variable annuities was hurt by changes in the tax laws that reduced
capital gains taxes for competing investments. Even so, the increased emphasis on
variable insurance sales meant that insurance companies increasingly grew to resemble
mutual fund managers or stockbrokers. This trend accelerated in the 1990s when multi-
line insurers faced large losses and sold off unprofitable operations such as their property
and casualty businesses. 2 27 Among those divesting various lines of insurance business
were Prudential Insurance Company of America, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,
and Travelers Insurance.
22 8
The assets held in the "separate" accounts required for variable annuity contracts
were in excess of $400 billion by 1995.229 This was an increase of over thirty percent
from 1994.230 Common stock constituted over sixty percent of the separate account
assets. 23 1 In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. SEC,2 32 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the separate accounts for a variable annuity contract constituted a
separate legal entity from the insurance company, which meant those accounts would be
regulated as investment companies.2 33 The SEC granted relief to allow insurance
companies to avoid most of the effects of this regulation.2 34 It did, however, set forth
requirements that insurance companies had to meet in order to sell securities to retail
customers.
235
222. 1996 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 53, at 27.
223. Irwin W. Goldberg, What's Hot and What's Not, BEST'S REVIEW - LIFE/HEALTH INS. ED., Feb. 1987,
at 24.
224. 1996 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 53, at 10.
225. Deborah Lohse, Shelf Space Gets Scarce for Annuities, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1998, at CI.
226. 1996 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 53, at 38.
227. Finance and Economics: Breaking Up is Hard to Do, ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 1998, at 77.
228. Leslie Scism, Behind the Curve: Old, Multiline Insurers Beset by Competition, Hurry to Restructure,
WALL ST. J., May 10, 1996, at Al.
229. 1996 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 53, at 7.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 973 (1964).
233. Id. at 387-88.
234. CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION: UNDERSTANDING THE CHANGING
ROLE OF BANKS, MUTUAL FUNDS, AND INSURANCE COMPANIES 39 (1997).
235. See Chubb Securities Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 76,829, at 78,391-93 (Nov. 24, 1993).
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Life Insurance remained in the mainstream of American finance. The life insurance
industry provided jobs to 2,238,000 individuals in 1995. Of those individuals, 1,541,200
were employed in home offices and another 696,800 were insurance agents, brokers, and
service personnel.2 36 Concern was expressed that the independent insurance agent "may
be headed the way of the milkman."' 23 7 Insurance agencies' profits were down and their
numbers were sharply reduced. There were some 80,000 independent insurance agencies
in the United States in the middle of the 1950s. That number fell to 70,000 in 1983 and
then plunged to 41,000 in 1992.238 The owners of those agencies were getting older,2 39
and they faced stiff competition from broker-dealers and banks.
H. Insurance Company Forays Into Banking
In an effort to meet bank competition, some insurance companies found ways
around the BHCA prohibition of the mixing of banking and nonbanking activities such as
insurance. Insurance companies mined loopholes in existing statutes and regulations just
as their bank competitors did in gaining entry into the insurance business. 24 0 The most
popular strategies to undertake banking activities involved unitary thrift holding
companies, nonbank banks, and limited purpose trust companies. Prior to GLB in 1999,
the Savings and Loan Holding Company Act (SLHCA)2 4 1 provided that a company
owning only a single thrift institution was not subject to any restrictions on other
activities undertaken by the company so long as the thrift subsidiary was a "qualified
thrift lender" (QTL).2 42 A QTL is a thrift that has sixty-five percent or more of its assets
devoted to housing or consumer-related lending. 243 Thus, an insurance company or its
holding company could purchase a single thrift, and if the thrift met the QTL test,
continue to conduct insurance or any other nonfinancial activities consistent with state
law.244 Pursuant to this authority, the Principal Financial Group, Travelers, State Farm,
American International Group, Inc., and The Equitable Companies, among others,
applied for permission to buy or establish their own thrift institutions.24 5
236. 1996 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 53, at 111.
237. John R. Wilke & Leslie Scism, Under the Gun: Insurance Agents Fight an Intrusion by Banks, But
Other Perils Loom, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1995, at Al (quoting Nancy Carini, an analyst with Conning & Co., a
market research firm).
238. See Nancy E. Carini, Conning: Agencies on Shaky Ground, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. AND CAS. -
RISK AND BENEFITS MGMT., Aug. 14, 1995, at 3.
239. The average agency owner was fifty-six. Wilke & Scism, supra note 237, at Al.
240. See infra Part III.
241. 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(1994).
242. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(3)(A) (1994). In addition, since a thrift institution is not considered a bank under
the BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(B), (j) (1994), a company that controls a thrift, but not a bank, is not a bank
holding company. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1994) (stating that "'bank holding company' means any company
which has control over any bank").
243. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(m)(l) (1994).
244. Unitary thrift holding companies have included an automobile company, a department store, a
homebuilder, and a hotel and entertainment company among others. See OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION,
HOLDING COMPANIES IN THE THRIFT INDUSTRY 4, 11 (1997), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/
48031 .html.
245. Wolcott B. Dunham et al., Convergence of Banking and Insurance 1146 PLI/CORP. 425, 428 (1999).
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A second strategy for entering banking arose prior to 1987 when the BHCA defined
a bank as an institution that both accepted demand deposits and made commercial loans.
Insurance companies and others desiring to enter the bank business exploited this
loophole by establishing or operating what became known as a "nonbank bank." A
nonbank bank was a "bank" because it had a bank charter and accepted deposits. It was a
"nonbank" because it failed to meet one of the two prongs of the BHCA's definition of
bank, either by accepting only savings deposits 246 but not demand deposits, or by making
consumer loans but not commercial loans.247 In 1987, Congress closed this loophole in
the Competitive Equality Banking Act (CEBA) 24 8 by redefining "bank" to include any
institution with FDIC deposit insurance. 249 Congress, however, grandfathered nonbank
banks existing as of March 5, 1987.250
These grandfathered institutions were subject to strict limitations. The grandfathered
nonbank banks (sometimes referred to as CEBA banks) were not permitted to expand
their activities beyond those conducted as of the grandfather date.25 1 The parent holding
company was prohibited from cross-marketing products to CEBA bank customers if such
products could not be offered by a bank holding company. 252 The CEBA bank was
prohibited from increasing its assets more than seven percent in any annual period.
25 3
Finally, CEBA prevented grandfathered CEBA banks from being sold. If the insurance
company parent was acquired, the CEBA bank lost its grandfather rights, and if the
insurance company parent elected to purchase an additional bank or a thrift institution, it
also forfeited the grandfather rights of the CEBA bank.
254
A third means by which insurance companies entered banking was by operating a
limited purpose trust company. 25 5 A trust company is not considered a "bank" under the
246. Savings deposits could be accessed by a negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW account), the
functional equivalent of a check. See generally Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp.,
474 U.S. 361 (1986) (holding that the FRB's regulatory attempt to define a demand deposit as an account like a
NOW account, that "as a matter of practice" is payable on demand, was in excess of the FRB's statutory
authority) (quoting the 12 C F.R. § 225.2(a)(1)(A) (1985) rules on NOW accounts).
247. A second type of nonbank bank is one formed after 1987 that has a bank charter, but does not have
FDIC deposit insurance. This option is quite unattractive and may not even be a practical alternative since
nationally chartered banks are required to have FDIC insurance and many states require banks chartered within
their state also to have FDIC insurance. See Dunham, supra note 245, at 433.
248. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1757(S).
249. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(A) (1994) (defining "bank" under the BHCA); 12 U.S.C. § 1813(h) (1994)
(defining "insured bank"). See also Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, at 362 (rebuffing the FRB's attempt to
close this loophole through a regulatory redefinition of "bank").
250. 12 U.S.C. § 1843((1)(A) (1994).
251. Id. § 1843(f)(3)(B).
252. Id. § 1843(f)(3)(B)(ii).
253. Id. § 1843(f)(3)(B)(iv).
254. Id. § 1843(f)(2)(A), (O(3)(B).
255. Insurance companies found other ways to expand into financial services. In October 1998, Prudential,
the English life assurer, began a direct banking operation. Summaries: Business This Week/Politics This Week,
EcONOMIST, Oct. 1, 1998, at 5. One effort in the 1980s by an insurance company to take over a bank failed.
Saul Steinberg's Reliance Group Holdings was unable to complete a hostile takeover of Chemical Bank. David
Leonhardt, Chief Executive Quits at Reliance Group, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 2000, at CI 1. The Equitable Life
Assurance Society of the United States established a fee-based financial planning program, wrap programs, a
wholesale distribution network for financial products, and a multi-manager mutual fund for variable insurance
products. Press Release, Dechert Price & Rhoads, Announcement Concerning Naomi Friedland-Wechsler
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BHCA if the institution functions "solely in a trust or fiduciary capacity," accepts only
trust funds (not demand deposits) as deposits, and does not offer FDIC insurance on these
deposits.2 56
I. Demutualization
Many insurance companies offering new financial products in new markets were
forced to consider transforming their capital structures and operations to meet
competition from banks and broker-dealers. 257 Additional capital also provided currency
for acquisitions and executive compensation structures. Although mutual life insurance
companies accounted for over thirty-five percent of total life insurance in the United
States in 1995,258 the mutual capital structure limits the ability of insurance companies to
raise capital. In response, New York adopted legislation permitting mutual life insurance
companies to convert to stock companies in order to allow mutuals to obtain additional
capital from stock issuance.259 The Equitable Life Assurance Society was among those in
need of capital, and it demutualized in 1992.260 In 1997, the Mutual Life Insurance
Company of New York announced that after 150 years in mutual form, it was converting
from a mutual life insurance company into a publicly owned company.2 6 1 In 1998,
Prudential, the nation's largest insurance company, announced that it was also
demutualizing. 262 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company planned to demutualize itself
through a public offering that would raise $5 billion. This was the largest financial
services offering in history. 263 In addition to the 130-year-old Metropolitan Life
(1999) (on file with author) (as of July 1, 2000, Dechert Price & Rhoads changed its name to "Dechert").
MetLife announced in October 1998, that it would use Raleigh, North Carolina, to test market a new financial
planning operation. Carol Frey, MetLife to Try New Operation, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Oct. 8, 1998, at
DI. Fulcrum Financial Advisors, an entity affiliated with MetLife and New England Financial, would handle
the operation. Id. The new entity was to provide customers with income tax planning, mortgages, and
investment planning advice. Id.
256. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(D) (1994).
257. 3 LEE R. RUSS, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D §§ 39:43 to :45 (1996); Wolcott B. Dunham, Jr.,
Demutualization of Life Insurers, 648 PLI/COMM. 9, 14-15 (1993); Edward X. Clinton, The Rights of
Policyholders in an Insurance Demutualization, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 657, 666-67 (1992); Note, Developing A
Demutualization Acquisition Strategy for Private Equity Firms, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1910 (1997). See
generally Gary P. Kreider, Who Owns the Mutuals? Proposals for Reform of Membership Rights in Mutual
Insurance and Banking Companies, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 275 (1972); Gordon 0. Perhson, Jr. et al.,
Demutualization of Insurance Companies: A Comparative Analysis of Issues and Techniques, 27 TORT & INS.
L.J. 709 (1992).
258. 1996 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 53, at 19.
259. Guy N. Ducharme, The Dark Side of Conversion (Conversion of Mutual Companies to Stock
Companies), BEST'S REVIEW-LIFE/HEALTH INS. ED., Jan. 1989, at 29.
260. ROUSMANIERE, supra note 42, at 321; Jane Bryant Quinn, Is Your Insurance Company Safe,
NEWSWEEK, July 29,1991, at 38.
261. Leslie Scism, MONY Plans Switch to Stock Ownership, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1997, at A2.
262. Leslie Scism, Prudential's Plan to Go Public Reflects Industry Trend: More Mutual Life Insurers
Need to Seek Outside Capital to Stay Competitive, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1998, at B4.
263. Business This Week, ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 1999, at A2.
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Insurance Company,2 64 several other mutual insurance companies converted to stock
corporations as a means to increase their capital.
265
J Summary
The insurance industry has always been regulated at the state level. Attempts to
impose federal regulation were repeatedly made, but nearly always successfully rebuffed
by the industry and state regulators. The NAIC attempted to respond to the complications
of conducting insurance in multiple states subject to regulation by multiple insurance
commissioners and encouraged states to adopt model insurance regulation acts.
Notwithstanding these efforts, insurance regulation still varies considerably from state to
state.
The state dominated model of insurance regulation stands in contrast to the
regulatory regime that has evolved for banks and securities firms. Both of these industries
are subject to a host of federal statutes and regulations. Banking retains a substantial dose
of state regulation for state banks, but all insured banking institutions must answer to at
least one federal regulator.26 6 As insurance companies developed variable annuity
contracts, they became subject to some functional regulation at the federal level by the
SEC. The conflict between state and federal regulators overseeing activities in the same
entity presaged many of the difficulties to be encountered by insurance firms endeavoring
to expand further into securities and into banking.
III. BANK INSURANCE ACTIVITIES
While insurance companies made forays into banking, banks worked to offer
insurance products to their customers. Bank entry into insurance was complicated by
numerous statutory and regulatory obstacles.267 Banks are institutions of limited powers
set forth by statute. Generally, state chartered banks may conduct business pursuant to the
mandates of state law. Nationally chartered banks are empowered to engage in a specific
set of activities under the NBA. In addition to regulation of the bank itself, many banks
are owned by a holding company. The activities of the holding company and its
nonbanking subsidiaries, before the passage of GLB, were regulated pursuant to the
BHCA by the FRB and were limited to banking and activities closely related to banking.
With a few exceptions, selling and underwriting insurance were viewed as financial
activities separate and distinct from the business of banking. Thus, the entry of banks and
bank holding companies into insurance since the early 1990's is an example of creative
264. Joseph B. Treaster, Metropolitan Life Plans to Reorganize as a Stock Company, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
1998, at Cl.
265. Joseph B. Treaster, Cold Shoulder to Insurance Customers, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1997, § 3, at 1.
266. The state's banking commissioner is the primary regulator of a state chartered bank. At the federal
level, state chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System are subject to regulation by the
FRB. The FDIC regulates state banks that have not joined the Federal Reserve System. See supra note 3.
267. For discussions of bank involvement in insurance, see generally Keith R. Fisher, Reweaving the Safety
Net: Bank Diversification into Securities and Insurance Activities, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 189-214
(1992); C.M. James Ill, Note, Delaware versus the Federal Reserve Board: Differing Views on Bank Holding
Company Involvement in Insurance, 34 How. L.J. 453 (1991); R. Bruce Miller, Note, NationsBank of North
Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.: Expanding National Bank Insurance Powers by Reading
Section 92 Out of the National Bank Act, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 951 (1995).
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lawyering and the acquiescence of regulators frustrated with the inability of Congress to
statutorily expand the permissible activities of banking organizations.
A. Insurance as a Bank Product
Banks have attempted to act as agents in selling insurance policies provided by
independent insurance companies and have in some instances elected to underwrite
particular types of insurance products as well as to sell them.26 8 Banks are attracted to
insurance for many reasons. Commissions and underwriting fees provide additional
revenues to financial service firms. 2 6 9 Such revenues are particularly needed by banks
that are increasingly being squeezed on interest rate margins and are experiencing
competition for deposit and loan customers from numerous nonbank competitors.
Offering insurance products to bank customers helps banks to offer a full array of
financial planning services and perhaps keeps customers who might otherwise be
attracted to insurance companies and mutual fund companies offering a wide range of
bank-like products. 270
Banks are well positioned to offer many insurance products to consumers. For
example, annuity products, typically offered by insurance companies, are financial
investment products with which banks have substantial familiarity. Perhaps most
significantly, banks have a perceived competitive advantage in marketing insurance over
independent insurance agencies or insurance companies selling products through their
own agents. Bank customers frequently visit their local bank branches; insurance
customers rarely visit their insurance agent's office. Bank customers receive monthly
communications from their bank in the form of bank statements in which inserts of
advertising ancillary products may easily be placed; insurance agents rarely communicate
with their insureds. Banks are knowledgeable about the financial circumstances of their
customers and thus are also able to anticipate their potential insurance needs; insurance
agents are less familiar with their customers and their financial circumstances. Finally,
many consumers place a great deal of trust and confidence in their banks and bankers;
insurance agents are often viewed as only being concerned with their own financial
interests. 27 1 Additionally, banks' association with the FDIC's federal deposit insurance
fund lends an aura of stability to bank-sold insurance.
Notwithstanding these significant advantages for banks, they face some additional
risks by engaging in insurance agency activities. Chief among them is customer
confusion regarding deposit insurance. Banks may trade on their reputations for trust and
security, and customers may be misled into thinking that their insurance policies are
federally guaranteed against loss. In addition, there is obvious potential for conflicts of
268. Underwriting insurance and selling insurance are two very different activities with different sets of
risks and rewards. The selling of insurance by an agent for an underwriter results in commissions for the agent
for each policy sold. The agent continues to receive a commission for each premium paid by the policyholder.
Underwriting requires the insurance company to set aside and manage premium reserves to meet claims of the
insured. Depending on the nature of the product and the structure of the insurer, fees and profits can be made by
the underwriter where the premiums paid exceed expenses and claims.
269. Paul Sweeney, Reaching Into Health and Property, U.S. BANKER, Apr. 2000, at 55.
270. Id. at 55 (stating that banks wish to "create value and broaden customer relationships") (quoting a
bank strategic consultant).
271. See New Law, New Powers ... New Initiatives?, ABA BANKING J., Apr. 1, 2000, at 43.
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interest for a bank acting as a disinterested investment counselor and also acting as an
insurance salesperson. Finally, there is a risk that because of their banking relationship
(particularly as loan applicants), customers might feel implicitly coerced to buy an
insurance product from their bank rather than a nonbank agent.27 2
Underwriting insurance is an intermediation function that banks may have sufficient
expertise to handle. However, an insurance underwriter assumes numerous risks that may
make this activity less attractive than serving as an insurance agent for banks. The profits
of underwriters are subject to interest rate fluctuations and mortality and actuarial
risks.2 73 Capital of a holding company devoted to insurance underwriting is devoted for
the long term and may not be easily transferred back into other parts of the banking
enterprise to fund other projects. If a particular insurance product does not perform well,
there is a risk to the reputation of the bank and a potential loss of confidence by bank
depositors in the individual bank or in the broader banking community. Presumably,
federal deposit insurance funds should not be put at risk for failed or failing insurance
products. A frequently voiced concern regarding the combination of banking and
nonbanking activities, including insurance, is that there might be "misuse or abuse [of]
the resources of a bank.., in order to gain an advantage [over non-bank competitors] in
the operation of the nonbanking activities." 274
B. State Bank Insurance Activities
For years, a number of states allowed their own state-chartered banks to provide
insurance services to their customers. 275 In 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance
272. CARL FELSENFELD, BANKING REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 182-83 (1998).
273. Banks may find some insurance products easier to underwrite than others. For instance, term life
insurance is easier to manage than automobile insurance. The latter requires a massive infrastructure for claim
adjustment. For auto insurance, pricing premiums and handling claims involve a great deal of special expertise.
See Sweeney, supra note 269, at 56.
274. S. REP. No. 84-1095, at 14 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2495 (reporting on the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956).
275. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 71, at 384; 2 D'ARISTA, supra note 162, at 78. South Dakota and
Delaware led the way in authorizing expansive insurance activities for banks chartered in their states. The FRB
challenged an early Citicorp application requesting permission for its South Dakota bank to engage in insurance
activities because the bank was to conduct an insignificant amount of bank activities and primarily operate as an
insurance agency. Orders Issued Under Bank Holding Company Act, Bank Merger Act, Bank Service
Corporation Act, and Federal Reserve Act, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 789 (1985).
Another challenge was mounted to Citicorp's subsequent attempt to engage in substantial insurance
activities through a Delaware state bank and nonbank subsidiary. Insurance trade associations joined the FRB in
challenging this activity, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the FRB did not have the authority
to regulate the activities of banks or subsidiaries of banks pursuant to the BHCA. Citicorp v. Bd. of Governors
of Fed. Res. Sys., 936 F.2d 66, 68 (2d Cir. 1991). See generally Tamar Frankel, The Dual State-Federal
Regulation of Financial Institutions-A Policy Proposal, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 53 (1987); Christian A. Johnson,
Wild Card Statutes Parity, and National Banks-The Renascence of State Banking Powers, 26 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 351 (1995); Martin E. Lybecker, The 'South Dakota' Experience and the Bush Task Group's Report:
Reconciling Perceived Overlaps in the Dual Regulation of Banking, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 71 (1987); David S.
Swayze & David B. Ripsom, The Delaware Banking Revolution: Are Expanded Powers Next?, 13 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 27 (1988); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal Response, and
the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133 (1990).
On December 13, 1984, the FDIC proposed an amendment to Part 332 of its regulations to prohibit
insured banks from directly engaging in real estate, underwriting insurance, reinsurance, and engaging in a
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Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) 276 limited the activities that might be engaged
in by state-chartered banks acting as a principal to those activities permissible for
national banks.2 77 Nevertheless, state-chartered banks could still engage in agency
activities authorized by their state chartering authorities. Other insurance activities, even
as a principal, could be authorized under FDICIA if permitted under state law, and if the
FDIC found the bank to be well-capitalized and concluded that the proposed activity
posed no risk to the safety and soundness of the federal deposit insurance fund.
2 7 8
However, FDICIA specifically prohibited insurance underwriting by state banks, except
to the extent permitted for national banks.2 7
9
Between 1995 and 1998, the number of states that allowed state banks to operate
insurance agencies increased from twenty-two to forty, although in some instances state
banks were entitled to expanded powers by virtue of so-called "wild card" statutes that
permitted state banks to engage in all activities permissible for national banks. 280 Several
other states permitted banks to sell annuities or insurance.2 8 1 Forty states granted their
state banks broad insurance sales powers throughout each of those states. 282 Seven states
permitted insurance sales, but only in designated locations (such as places of less than
5,000 in population).2 83 Two states permitted insurance sales only in designated places,
but permitted insurance products to be marketed throughout the state. 2 8 4 One
state-Massachusetts--did not permit state-chartered banks to engage in any insurance
activities.
2 8 5
surety business. See Powers Inconsistent with the Purposes of Federal Deposit Law, 49 Fed. Reg. 48,552
(proposed Dec. 13, 1984) (proposing to amend 12 C.F.R. pt. 332). The underlying purpose behind the FDIC's
proposed rule was to "assure the safe and sound operation of insured banks by prohibiting activities that are
inconsistent with the purpose of federal deposit insurance." Id. Banks would, however, be allowed to conduct
insurance activities in a bona fide subsidiary, subject to various restrictions. ld.
After receiving 517 comments over a sixty-day comment period, the FDIC issued a revised proposal
which, among other things, permitted an insured bank to operate a life insurance underwriting department
within the bank, subject to various conditions. See Powers Inconsistent with the Purposes of Federal Deposit
Law, 50 Fed. Reg. 23,964, 23,980 (June 7, 1985) (revising proposed amendments to 12 C.F.R. pt. 332). Over
two years later, the FDIC withdrew the proposed rule, claiming that it had grown "stale" and needed updating.
See Powers Inconsistent with the Purposes of Federal Deposit Law, 52 Fed. Reg. 48,447 (Dec. 22, 1987)
(withdrawing proposed amendments to 12 C.F.RI pt. 332). More importantly, since there had been no system-
wide problems (i.e., bank failures) resulting from the newly granted insurance powers, the FDIC decided to
grant banks a degree of leeway. Id. at 48,448.
276. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
277. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act § 303(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (1994).
278. 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(a)(l) (1994).
279. Id. § 1831 a(b)(l). There was a limited grandfather provision for subsidiaries of state chartered banks
to continue but not expand these previously permissible underwriting activities. Id. § 1831 a(d)(2)(B).
280. See Michael D. White, It's Time for Banks and Agents to Work Together, BANK INS. MARKETING,
Autumn 1997, at 32-34, 38, available at http://www.bankinsurance.com/mwa/publications/articles/.
281. See White, supra note 76, at 125-27.
282. See id. at 126.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See id.
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C. National Bank Insurance Activities
There are two sources of authority for national banks to engage in insurance
activities: the "place of 5,000" exception in section 92 of the National Banking Act
(NBA) (which is discussed below) and section 24(seventh) of the NBA providing that
national banks may engage in the business of banking and "all such incidental powers as
shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking."'286 Section 24(seventh) does not
permit national banks to act generally as insurance agents or underwriters. 2 87 The Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), however, recognized numerous exceptions to
this general rule. It approved underwriting of title insurance2 88 and credit life
insurance, 2 89 as well as acting as an agent in the sale of title insurance, 290 credit life
insurance, 29 1 municipal bond insurance,2 92 and mortgage reinsurance.
29 3
286. 12 U.s.c. § 24(seventh) (1994). With regard to activities incidental to the business of banking, the
United States Supreme Court held in NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 258 n.2
(1995), that the Comptroller may authorize additional activities if they are within a reasonable interpretation of
§ 24(seventh). See also Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 432 (1st Cir. 1972) (finding that incidental
powers are those that are "convenient or useful in connection with the performance of one of the bank's
established activities pursuant to its express powers"). See generally Julie L. Williams & Mark P. Jacobsen, The
Business of Banking: Looking to the Future, 50 Bus. LAW. 783, 786 (1995); Julie L. Williams & James F.E.
Gillespie, Jr., The Business of Banking: Looking to the Future-Part 11, 52 BUS. LAW. 1279, 1283 (1997);
Edward L. Symons, Jr., The 'Business of Banking' in Historical Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 676
(1983).
287. Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Ind. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1968) (citing § 92 powers).
288. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 377, Title Insurance Policy Activities of Operating Subsidiary of
National Bank, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,601, at 77,901 (Feb. 6, 1987).
289. OCC Corporate Decision No. 98-28, The Fleet Letter, (May 11, 1998) (approving the underwriting of
credit-related insurance since it "enhances a lender's ability to receive payment for its loans" and is "incidental
to banking") cited in 0CC Interpretive Letter No. 835, Bank Permitted to Retain Minority Interest in Credit Life
Reinsurer, [1998-1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-289, at 90,210 n.10 (July 31, 1998);
see also OCC Interpretive Letter No. 835, [1998-1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. 81-289, at
90,207.
290. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 368, Banks May Act as Agent in the Sale of Title Insurance
Incidental to Its Express Authority to Make Loans Secured by Real Property, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,538, at 77,836 (July 1i, 1986). The OCC found the sale of title insurance to be
incidental to a national bank's express authority to make loans secured by real estate. Id. The Second Circuit
held, however, that pursuant to section 92, banks in towns of more than 5,000 could not act as an agent in
selling title insurance. See Am. Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150, 151 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508
U.S. 971 (1993); see also KIRSCH, supra note 234, at 72; Leigh Rademacher, Powers of National Banks to Sell
Insurance, Annuities and Securities from Bank Premises, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 753, 754 (1997).
291. See 12 C.F.R. § 2.4 (1999). Credit life insurance was found permissible for sale by national banks in
part because this form of insurance was not generally available from insurance agencies not affiliated with
banks. See Indep. Bankers Ass'n v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823
(1980); see also Julie L. Williams et al., After Barnett: The Intersection of National Bank Insurance Powers and
State Regulation, I N.C. BANKING INST. 13, 17 (1997). The OCC's approval for a bank to act as agent for the
sale of crop insurance was recently struck down by the D.C. Circuit, even though the OCC urged that crop
insurance was similar to credit-related insurance. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638, 642, 645
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
292. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 338, Issuance of Standby Letters of Credit by Subsidiary to Support
Municipal Bond Issues, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,508, at 77,790 (May 2,
1985); see also Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278, 282-83 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that municipal bond
insurance was functionally equivalent to a standby letter of credit, the issuance of which was traditionally
viewed as an activity incidental to banking activities).
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National banks made further inroads into the insurance business in 1995 when the
Supreme Court held in NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Co. (VALIC 1/),294 that a national bank could sell fixed and variable rate
annuities. 2 95 The Court found that annuities were financial investment products (rather
than insurance) for purposes of federal banking law and that banks may act as agents or
brokers with respect to them.296 Although annuities may not be insurance products under
the NBA, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that annuities remain insurance
products for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act so that their sale is subject to state
insurance regulation.297 The Eleventh Circuit recently held that underwriting an annuity
involves a type of risk-shifting that is not the business of banking, but rather the business
of insurance.
2 9 8
Additionally, national banks successfully exploited a previously overlooked
provision of the NBA to expand their insurance agency activities. Section 92 of the NBA,
which was added in 1916, permitted a national bank located in a place of less than five
thousand to act as an insurance agent.299 The policies sold had to be written by
unaffiliated insurance companies. 30 0 This statute, some believed, was repealed in
1918,301 and beginning in 1952, the section was even omitted from the United States
293. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 743, A National Bank Could Establish an Operating Subsidiary to
Reinsure the Mortgage Insurance on Loans Originated or Purchased by the Parent Bank or an Affiliates, [1996-
1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-108, at 90,237 (Oct. 17, 1996) (permitting a national
bank to establish an operating subsidiary for the purpose of reinsuring a portion of the mortgage insurance on
loans made by the national bank); see also Williams et al., supra note 291, at 20.
294. 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
295. See id. at 251. The earlier case of SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. ofAm., 359 U.S. 65 (1959), is
sometimes referred to as VALIC I. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
296. See NationsBank, 513 U.S. at 260; see also Rademacher, supra note 290, at 761.
297. See Am. Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 84 F.3d 834, 842-43 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 870
(1996) (holding that a so-called "retirement certificate of deposit," which was a fixed annuity investment
product, was subject to Illinois insurance regulations). This holding has been criticized as inconsistent with
VALICI and the Supreme Court's 1959 holding in SEC v. Variable Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959), that
annuities are not insurance products for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See Williams et al., supra note
291, at 13, 33; John Jaye, Note, The Retirement CD and Recent OCC Action Regarding Banks-in-Insurance, 1
N.C. BANKING INST. 194, 205-14 (1997). Subsequently issued IRS regulations provided that interest on these
certificates of deposit could not accumulate tax free, effectively eliminating the justification for the product. 26
C.F.R. § 1.1275-1(d) (1999).
298. See Blackfeet Nat'l Bank v. Nelson, 171 F.3d 1237, 1245-49 (11 th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
497 (1999).
299. See Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 752, 753-54 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994));
Rademacher, supra note 290, at 754-55; Linda B. Tigges, Note, Functional Regulation of Bank Insurance
Activities: The Time Has Come, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 455, 459 (1998). See also Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of
Ind. Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010, 1016 (5th Cir. 1968) (giving a brief history of section 92).
300. See J. Virgil Mattingly & Keiran J. Fallon, Understanding the Issues Raised by Financial
Modernization, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 25, 29 (1998).
301. David W. Roderer, Nonexistent Banking Law Warrants Closer Scrutiny, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 9, 1984, at
12 ("While compiling the many provisions [of] the omnibus banking legislation passed in 1982... federal
lawyers leamed-and quietly acknowledged that in 1918 another important provision of law [section 92] was
repealed inadvertently.").
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Code compilation.302 The repeal controversy was put to rest in 1993 when the United
States Supreme Court held that the statute was still on the books.
30 3
When the Comptroller ruled that insurance customers need not be located in a place
of five thousand, this statute became a powerful tool for national banks seeking to sell
insurance. 304 While it is true that the statute only restricted the bank's location to the
place of less than five thousand, many believed that the original intention of the section
was to give small town banks an additional source of income, rather than to permit those
banks or branches to sell insurance nationwide. 305 An interpretive letter issued by the
Comptroller of the Currency to First Union National Bank detailed the connections that
the OCC suggested must exist between the bank's facility located in the place of less than
five thousand and the conduct of the insurance agency business.30 6 The letter required
that all agents be licensed from the office in the place of less than five thousand, but
permitted marketing and sales activities to be conducted outside of the place of five
thousand.307
Because the McCarran-Ferguson Act had long been thought to provide exclusively
for state regulation of the business of insurance, the operation of insurance agencies by
national banks inevitably conflicted with state insurance statutes and regulations. In
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson,308 the Supreme Court held that state
legislation could not restrict national banks from selling insurance. 309 The legislation in
question was a Florida anti-affiliation statute that prevented banks from being affiliated
with entities selling insurance within the state.3 10 While the McCarran-Ferguson Act
provided that regulation of insurance was relegated to the states and that federal law was
not to preempt it, the Act excepts federal statutes specifically regulating insurance from
302. 2 J. J. CRANMORE ET AL., BANKING LAW § 26.081] (1991).
303. See U.S. Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439,463 (1993).
304. See Indep. Ins. Agents of Am. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 960 (D.C. Cit. 1993) (finding that customers
may be solicited outside of the place of 5,000).
305. 2 CRANMORE ET AL., supra note 302, § 26.08[1]; see Ala. Ass'n of Ind. Ins. Agents v. Bd. of
Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., 533 F.2d 224, 243 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting that the legislative history indicated that
the primary purpose of the statute was to give small town banks a source of income).
306. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 753, Banks Cleared to Sell Insurance and Annuities, [1996-1997
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-107, at 90,220 (Nov. 4, 1996) [hereinafter OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 753]; see also Tigges, supra note 299, at 462; Williams et al., supra note 291, at 13, 15-16. This
ruling was upheld in Indep. Ins. Agents ofAm.. Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
307. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 753, supra note 306, at 90,220. In OCC Interpretive Letter No. 823,
A "Place" for Purposes of Bank's Insurance Sales Was a Place as Defined by Census, [1997-1998 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-272, at 90,277 (Feb. 27, 1998) [hereinafter OCC Interpretive Letter
No. 823], the Comptroller stated that it interprets the word "place" in accordance with the Census Bureau's
definition. Thus, a "place" can be an incorporated area or a "census designated place" (CDP), defined as a
densely settled concentration of population, identifiable by name, but not legally incorporated. Id. at 90,278. A
CDP must have 1,000 or more persons if it is located outside an urbanized area (which is defined as a settled
area of at least 50,000 persons) or 2,500 or more persons if it is inside the boundaries of an urbanized area. Id. at
90,278.
308. 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
309. Id. at 25-26; see also Laura Turner Beyer, Introduction, North Carolina Banking in 1997: The Year in
Review, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. i, xviii (1998) (discussing how "North Carolina banks expanded into the
insurance business in 1997 in an effort to take advantage of deregulation in the financial services industry").
310. Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 25-26.
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this reverse-preemption rule.3 11 The Supreme Court held in Barnett Bank that section 92
of the NBA did specifically regulate insurance because it provided that national banks
could sell insurance in a place of less than five thousand. Therefore, section 92 did
preempt inconsistent state statutes purporting to regulate insurance.
3 12
In 1996, the OCC issued an advisory letter stating that it would find state insurance
regulation problematic where it treats or affects national banks offering insurance
differently than other insurance agents.3 13 State statutes subsequently challenged by
national banks included a Rhode Island statute that limited the ability of national banks to
use customer information to solicit and sell insurance; 314 a New York statute that barred
national banks in small towns from selling insurance to their loan customers; 3 15 and an
Ohio statute that limited the ability of national banks to sell insurance to their
customers.
3 16
D. Nonbanking Subsidiary of a Bank Holding Company
Bank holding companies could undertake expanded activities through their
nonbanking subsidiaries. Prior to 1982, many bank holding companies had subsidiaries
that performed insurance agency functions, and some even underwrote credit life, credit
accident, and health insurance. 3 17 The possibility for expansion of insurance activities
through the holding company largely evaporated, however, with the passage of the Garn-
St Germain Act of 1982.318 That Act provided that "it is not closely related to
banking... for a bank holding company to provide insurance as a principal, agent, or
broker,"3 19 with certain exceptions. Among the exceptions were two grandfather
provisions, including one for activities authorized before 1982.320 These grandfathered
insurance sales provisions have been interpreted to be transferable upon acquisition.32 1
311. 15U.S.C.§ 1012(b) (1994).
312. Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 25.
313. See OCC Advisory Letter 96-8, Guidance to National Banks on Insurance and Annuity Sales
Activities, 4 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 35-163, at 37,755 (Oct. 8, 1996) (stating that state statutes should
not significantly interfere with the national bank's ability to undertake activities authorized by federal law).
314. Preemption Determination, 62 Fed. Reg. 1950 (Jan. 14, 1997). The OCC never ruled on this
preemption request. Lee Ann Gjertsen, Insurers See Fight Looming on OCC Preemption of States, AM.
BANKER, July 13, 2000, at 1.
315. See N.Y. Bankers Ass'n v. Levin, 999 F. Supp. 716, 718 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). In Levin, the New York
insurance commissioner gave Canandaigua National Bank a license to sell insurance pursuant to § 2501 of the
New York Insurance Law, but banned it from writing policies for property pledged as collateral from its
borrowers (the Canandaigua branch was located in Bloomfield, a town of 1331 residents). Id. Applying the
Barnett Bank holding, the federal district court ruled that the NBA preempted the New York law, which
interfered with the bank's right to sell insurance products to its loan customers. Id. at 719.
316. See Ass'n of Banks in Ins. Inc. v. Duryee, 55 F. Supp. 2d 799, 812 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (striking down an
Ohio statute in conflict with § 92 of the NBA pursuant to Barnett Bank).
317. See FELSENFELD, supra note 272, at 187.
318. The Gain-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
319. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994).
320. Id. § 1843(cX8)(D), (G). The second grandfather provision related to bank holding companies that
became subject to the Bank Holding Company Act in 1970.
321. Nat'l Ass'n of Casualty and Surety Agents v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 856 F.2d 282,
282 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
2000]
The Journal of Corporation Law
Moreover, an exception parallel to section 92 of the NBA exists for activities of the
nonbanking subsidiary in a place of less than five thousand people. 322 The FRB has not
read this exception as expansively for nonbanking subsidiaries as the OCC has read
section 92 for national banks. 323 Exceptions also existed for small bank holding
companies with total assets of less than $50 million324 and for providing credit-related
insurance as a principal or agent.3 25 Notwithstanding the many exceptions contained in
the BHCA, the clear general rule forbidding bank holding companies from participating
in insurance precluded the FRB from authorizing bank holding companies to engage in or
affiliate with companies underwriting insurance. 326
E. Other Avenues for Bank Insurance Activities
There were, of course, other ways that banks proceeded through the restrictive
regulatory landscape dealing with insurance activities. Bank holding companies
established offshore subsidiaries to engage in reinsuring insurance policies sold
abroad-a practice similar to underwriting, although not as risky.327 Nonbank financial
institutions also sometimes engaged in insurance activities. State chartered savings banks
in some New England states were permitted to underwrite life insurance.32 8 A thrift
institution, owned by a unitary thrift holding company, found that it could engage in
insurance through other subsidiaries of the thrift holding company. Indeed, as previously
discussed, a number of insurance companies took advantage of this provision and bought
or formed thrift institution subsidiaries prior to the enactment of GLB. 329
F. Bank Involvement in Insurance Pre-Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Even prior to the enactment of GLB, banks had significant involvement in insurance
activities. The bulk of bank insurance activities pre-GLB were agency activities
conducted either by state banks pursuant to state authority or by national banks pursuant
to section 92 of the NBA. National banks could claim special advantage in the insurance
agency area--the ability to preempt state insurance regulations pursuant to the
interpretation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the NBA in the Barnett Bank case. 330
322. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(C). This exception is also available if the bank holding company demonstrated
that the place had inadequate insurance facilities. Id. § 1834(c)(8)(C); see Independent Ins. Agents of Am. v.
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 835 F.2d 1452, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (relaxing the interpretation of this
exception to require only that there be a lending office in the place of less than 5,000 and not the principal place
of business).
323. See PAULINE B. HELLER, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW § 5.01 (1998).
324. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(F) (1994).
325. Id. § 1843(c)(8)(A).
326. See Mattingly & Fallon, supra note 300, at 29-30.
327. See Regulation K, 12 C.F.R § 211.5(d)(16) (2000). Regulation K, though it does not expressly
authorize reinsurance by an offshore subsidiary, has been interpreted to allow for such activity. See Federal
Reserve Board, No-Action Letter (May 20, 1997), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/legalint/Foreign/1997/19970520. See also Niamh Ring, Hold the Underwriters: Bankers Mull
Insurance Merger Opportunities, AM. BANKER, Apr. 25, 2000, at 1 (describing a bank underwriting fixed
annuities through an offshore reinsurance process pursuant to Regulation K).
328. 3 JOHN C. DEAL ET AL., BANKING LAW, § 55.04 (1991).
329. See supra Part II.H.
330. See supra Part III.C.
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In addition to agency activities, some banks underwrote credit-related insurance.
Seventy percent of all banks offered some insurance products ranging from annuities
33 1
and credit-related insurance to property, life, 332 and medical insurance. 333 Although
annuities and credit-related insurance were the most commonly offered bank insurance
products, many banks offered insurance products other than these traditional ones. In the
annuity market, banks were significant participants, accounting for twenty-five to thirty
percent of all annuity sales.334 Fully one-third of all fixed annuities and twelve percent of
all variable annuity products were sold at banks.
BB&T Corporation, parent company of state-chartered Branch Banking and Trust
Company, headquartered in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, operated insurance agencies
since 1922 and exemplifies a successful marriage of banking and insurance agency
activities. 335 Beginning in the mid-1980's, it expanded its insurance agency operations
through an aggressive acquisition strategy of independent agencies. The strategy assumed
that there were opportunities for profit by putting agencies with duplicative back office
operations under one roof and reducing overall costs. As a result of this strategy, BB&T
has one of the thirty largest insurance agency systems in the country--bank or
nonbank. 336 BB&T sells life, health, title, and property insurance products.
337
IV. GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ARRIVES
The statutory authority for companies that own banks to also directly engage in
selling and underwriting insurance came with the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act on November 12, 1999.338 This significant legislation opened the door to permit
holding companies to engage in financial services including insurance, securities, and
merchant banking. The statutory and regulatory structure under which these new
activities may be undertaken is quite complex as will be discussed in more detail in this
part. Moreover, there remain significant opportunities for regulatory conflict that are not
solved by GLB's seemingly wholesale adoption of a scheme of functional regulation.
Two significant events preceded and paved the way for GLB's enactment---the
conversion of important segments of the insurance industry to bank participation in
331. Annuity sales by banks were some $4 billion in 1987. White, supra note 76, at 128. That figure
increased to $16.4 billion by 1994. Id.
332. PHILLIP L. ZWEIG, WRISTON: WALTER WRISTON, CITIBANK, AND THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN
FINANCIAL SUPREMACY 809 (1995) (documenting how Citibank was among the banks selling life insurance).
333. In 1991, banks sold $300 million in ordinary life and health insurance. White, supra note 76, at 130. In
1995, that figure increased to $3.6 billion. Id. By 1996, most banks sold some form of life insurance product. Id.
at 129.
334. KIRSCH, supra note 234, at 85. In 1995, banks accounted for 20% of the market for annuities in the
United States. Wilke & Scism, supra note 237, at Al. First Union National Bank, headquartered in North
Carolina, sold over $1 billion in annuities in 1996, which was a dramatic increase from $30 million in 1993.
White, supra note 76, at 129.
335. Sweeney, supra note 269, at 57.
336. Id. See also Larry Larocco, Banks' Role In Insurance To Grow After Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH - FIN. SERVS. ED., Nov. 15, 1999, at 7 (stating that Wells Fargo, a bank, runs
the seventh largest insurance agency in the United States).
337. See Sweeney, supra note 269, at 55.
338. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A. and 15 U.S.C.A.).
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insurance, and the creation of Citigroup, a holding company formed by the merger of
Citibank, a bank holding company, and Travelers, an insurance company.
A. The Insurance Industry Capitulates
Initially, the trade association for independent insurance agents ferociously opposed
bank intrusion into the insurance industry.339 Clearly, banks were a threat to their
existence. 340 Independent agencies already faced competition from direct line purchasers
that allowed consumers to buy insurance from the insurance underwriting company
without having to pay an intervening agency. As one writer noted, "[W]e are witnessing
the virtual disappearance, nominally, of the 'life insurance agent' as this person is now
being named 'financial planner."' 34 1 This transformation occurred because many
insurance agents and securities brokers were cross-licensed, and many securities brokers
selling insurance were working for a bank affiliate. The insurance lobby effectively
capitulated to bank competition in 1997 when the Independent Insurance Agents of
America announced that it would support legislation allowing the affiliation of banks and
insurance finns if functional regulation of insurance activities by the traditional state
regulator was retained, and if appropriate consumer protection measures were enacted.
342
Perhaps the insurance underwriters decided that banks functioned as good retail delivery
vehicles for insurance products and that empowering more bank affiliated insurance
agents could improve insurance company sales. 3
4 3
B. Creation of Citigroup
The biggest bombshell in the world of banks and insurance arrived in April of 1998
when Citicorp announced that it was merging with Travelers Group, which also owned
Salomon Brothers and Smith Barney. 344 The value of this merger was set at $83
billion.3 45 The combined firm's holding company became Citigroup, Inc. Citigroup had
more than 100 million customers world wide and offered a wide range of products
ranging from corporate finance to consumer banking and securities. The FRB approval of
the Citibank/Travelers merger was subject to a requirement that the new Citigroup divest
itself of the Travelers insurance underwriting unit because of the restrictions on bank
339. Much of the litigation that opposed bank involvement in insurance was initiated by an industry trade
group--the Independent Insurance Agents of America. See, e.g., Indep. Ins. Agents of Am. v. Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Res. Sys., 890 F.2d 1275, 1284 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 810 (1990) (upholding FRB's
determination that the nonbanking prohibitions of the BHCA do not apply to subsidiaries of state-chartered
banks engaged in insurance activities pursuant to state law).
340. JOHN SPIEGEL ET AL., BANKING REDEFINED: How SUPERREGIONAL POWERHOUSEs ARE RESHAPING
FINANCIAL SERVICES 17 (1996).
341. Howard J. Saks, Merging of the Life Insurance and Securities Industries Accelerates, 25 EST. PLAN.
326 (1998).
342. See FELSENFELD, supra note 272, at 192; Bill McConnell, Agents Endorse Measure that Would Let
Banks Own Insurers, AM. BANKER, Jan. 17, 1997, at 2.
343. Trevor Thomas, Distribution Continues as CEOs' Top Issue, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH -
FIN. SERVS. ED., Apr. 3, 2000, at 3. Product distribution is a growing concern for insurance companies who
have expanded the use of "broker dealers, financial planners and banks." Id.
344. See Order Issued Under Bank Holding Company Act, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 985 (Nov. 1998); Matt
Murray, Citigroup Expecting to Chop 8,000Jobs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1998, at A3.
345. Michael Siconolfi, Big Umbrella, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1998, at Al.
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holding companies engaging in insurance underwriting activities. 346 The divestiture
period, however, was by statute a minimum of two years, which could potentially be
extended to a maximum of five years upon application to the FRB. 34 7 This merger placed
increased pressure on Congress to repeal bank restrictions on insurance activities,
especially underwriting. Therefore, a portion of GLB was addressed to that concern. 34 8
C. Gramm-Leach-Bliley
GLB significantly expanded the ability of banks to engage in insurance activities.
The Act created a new type of bank holding company called a "financial holding
company" (FHC).34 9 Effective March 11, 2000,350 an FHC may engage in activities that
are financial in nature, including banking, securities, insurance (underwriting as well as
sale as an agent), and merchant banking. 35 1 To qualify as an FHC, each subsidiary of a
bank holding company must be well-capitalized and well-managed, and have received a
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) rating of at least satisfactory at the depository
subsidiary's most recent CRA examination.3 52
GLB also created a new category of direct subsidiary of a bank called a "financial
subsidiary," which enables banks to expand their financial activities without the necessity
of creating an FHC or qualifying as an FHC.353 As a general matter, a financial
subsidiary may engage in many of the same activities as a subsidiary of an FHC.354 A
significant exception, however, is that insurance underwriting may not be conducted in a
financial subsidiary, necessitating qualification as an FHC for any bank holding company
interested in engaging in insurance underwriting activities. 355 To qualify as a financial
subsidiary, GLB requires that the bank and each depository institution affiliate be well-
capitalized and well-managed.35 6 Although GLB significantly expanded the activities
that may be conducted by banks and their affiliates, the structure and placement of those
346. See Matt Murray, Fed Approves Citicorp-Travelers Merger, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1998, at A3.
347. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1994).
348. Michale Schroeder, It's Alive, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1998, at Al.
349. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103(c)(1)(b), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(p) (West Supp. 2000).
350. See note 4 supra.
351. Id. § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(4).
352. Id. § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(1).
353. Id. § 121, 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a.
354. Compare Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 121(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2000) (a
national bank may control a financial subsidiary that engages in "activities that are financial in nature or
incidental to a financial activity"), with id. § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(l)(A) (an FHC may engage in any
activity that the FRB determines "to be financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity").
355. Id. § 121, 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(2)(B)(i). A financial subsidiary is also precluded from merchant
banking activities for the five year period following adoption of GLB, at which time the FRB and the Secretary
of the Treasury may adopt rules permitting such activity. Id. § 122, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1834 note.
356. Id. § 121, 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(2)(C). Further, the aggregate consolidated total assets of all financial
subsidiaries of the national bank must not exceed the lesser of 45% of the consolidated total assets of the parent
bank or $50 billion. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 121, 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(2)(D) (West Supp. 2000). If the
bank is one of the 50 largest insured banks, it must have at least one issue of outstanding eligible debt currently
rated within the three highest investment grade rating categories. See id. § 121, 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(3)(A)(i). If
the bank is one of the second 50 largest, it must meet all the above criteria or any other criteria set forth by FRB
and the Treasury Department. Id. § 121, 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(3)(A)(ii).
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activities continue to play an important role in planning permissible new ventures as will
be discussed further below with respect to insurance activities.
GLB continues the McCarran-Ferguson Act's requirement that insurance be
regulated at the state level. 357 GLB specifically addresses the interaction between state
insurance regulators and federal banking regulators, anticipating the likely regulatory
struggle. 358 The Act's adoption of a functional regulatory structure is likely to be put to
the test in regulating the insurance activities of banking organizations.
1. Nonbanking Subsidiary of a Holding Company
Prior to GLB, section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA mandated that bank holding company
subsidiaries engage only in those activities "so closely related to banking... as to be a
proper incident thereto." 35 9 This section declared that "it is not closely related to banking
or managing or controlling banks for a bank holding company to provide insurance as a
principal, agent, or broker" except in certain circumstances provided for in the section.
360
GLB replaced this section with a provision that a bank holding company could continue
to engage in those activities permitted by the FRB as of the day before the enactment of
GLB. 36 1 Thus, the insurance activities of nonbanking subsidiaries of a bank holding
company were not expanded by GLB but may continue in accordance with section
4(c)(8) of the BHCA.
GLB also authorized the creation of a financial holding company as a new type of
bank holding company. An FHC may conduct all activities permitted under the BHCA
and, in addition, may engage in activities that are (A) "financial in nature or incidental to
such financial activity," or (B) "complementary to a financial activity" and do not present
a substantial risk to the safety or soundness of the depository institution subsidiaries or
the financial system.362 Specifically listed as activities that are financial in nature are
"[i]nsuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying against loss, harm, damage, illness, disability,
or death, or providing and issuing annuities, and acting as principal, agent, or broker for
purposes of the foregoing, in any State." 363 Moreover, it is permissible for an FHC
subsidiary to own shares, assets, or ownership interests in a company or other entity if
such ownership represents an investment made in the normal course of business by an
insurance company in accordance with state law regulating such investments, and the
FHC does not routinely manage or operate the company in which it holds the investment,
except as necessary to ensure a reasonable return on the investment.
364
Thus, GLB legitimates Citigroup's ownership of both Citibank and Travelers
Insurance Company. Bank holding companies that wish to expand into insurance
357. Id. § 104, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6701(a). The FRB is granted authority over all the FHC's activities including
insurance in its role as the "umbrella" supervisor. See discussion infra note 387 and accompanying text.
358. See infra Part IV.C.5.
359. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994).
360. Id. § 1843(c)(8).
361. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 102(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(c)(8) (West Supp. 2000).
362. Id. § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(1).
363. Id. § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(4)(B).
364. Id. § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(4)(1). Once the holding company has qualified as an FHC, prior
approval is not required for it to engage in an activity pursuant to section 1843(k)(4) or pursuant to any FRB
regulation issued under section 1 843(k)(5). Id. § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(6)(B).
[Sumnmer
Banking and Insurance: Before and After GLB
underwriting need to qualify as an FHC and conduct underwriting activities in a
subsidiary of an FHC. Numerous institutions have already filed as FHCs, enabling them
to expand their financial activities when they desire.3 65
2. National Banks and National Bank Subsidiaries
Under GLB, neither a national bank nor its subsidiary may underwrite insurance
unless underwriting was permitted by enforceable OCC rulings as of January 1, 1999.366
These authorities permit underwriting of credit-related insurance products. 367 The Act,
however, specifically prohibits the underwriting of title insurance or an annuity contract
even if it has already been approved by the OCC.3 6 8
Although the financial subsidiaries of national banks-like the subsidiaries of an
FHC-are authorized to engage generally in activities that are "financial in nature or
incidental to a financial activity" under GLB, insurance underwriting and annuity
issuance are specifically excluded for a financial subsidiary even though both are
permitted for an FHC subsidiary.369 This curious distinction is apparently the result of a
compromise of the turf war between the FRB (regulator of FHCs, bank holding
companies, and their respective nonbank subsidiaries) and the OCC (primary regulator of
national banks and national bank subsidiaries). 370 The compromise position was
apparently premised on an assumption that certain financial activities were too risky to be
placed in a financial subsidiary of a bank. Included on the list of impermissible activities
for a bank's financial subsidiary are underwriting insurance, issuing annuities, real estate
investment and development, and merchant banking.37 1
Section 92 of the NBA, permitting national banks to act as an insurance agent in a
place of less than five thousand, was not repealed by GLB, so presumably national banks
may still conduct insurance agency activities in offices of the national bank located in a
place of less than five thousand people.372 A financial subsidiary of a national bank is not
365. Eileen Canning, Financial Services: Fed Chief Says Financial Holding Companies Should Take on
New Ventures with Caution, BNA BANKING DAILY, May 26, 2000, at D2. As of mid-May, 2000, 270 domestic
banking organizations and 17 foreign banking organizations had qualified as FHCs. Id.
366. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 302(a), (b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6712(a), (b) (West Supp. 2000).
367. See supra note 289 and accompanying text; see also OCC Interpretive Letter No. 886, (Mar. 27,
2000), 2000 WL 529016 (concluding that national banks and their subsidiaries may continue to underwrite
credit-related insurance products relating to their own loans and to those of nonaffiliated financial institution
lenders and credit-related insurance was an "authorized product" for national banks as of January 1, 1999).
368. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 302(b)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6712(b)(3) (West Supp. 2000).
369. Id. § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(2).
370. The FRB wished to retain its traditional control over the nonbanking activities of bank holding
companies and prevent a national bank from engaging in the whole panoply of nonbanking activities in its
subsidiaries outside the FRB's reach. See Patricia A. McKoy, Banking Law Manual § 4.02, at 4-15 (2d ed.
2000) (describing the compromise between the FRB and OCC by which Congress carved out the four financial
activities that it deemed to be of highest risk and confined them to FHCs and therefore to the jurisdiction of the
FRB).
371. Id. § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(2)(B). Merchant banking may potentially be approved for
financial subsidiaries upon the expiration of the five year period following GLB's enactment. See id. § 122, 12
U.S.C.A. § 1843 note.
372. James M. Cain & John J. Fahey, Banks and Insurance Companies-Together in the New Millennium,
55 Bus. LAW. 1409, 1414 (2000).
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subject to the place of five thousand limitation,37 3 however, and for this reason it is likely
that many national banks will transfer their insurance agency activities to a financial
subsidiary.374
In another curious restriction, GLB forbids the sale of title insurance by a national
bank unless authorized under state law for a state-chartered bank.375 In such a state, a
national bank may also sell title insurance subject to the same restrictions applicable to
the state-chartered bank.3 76 The title insurance sale restriction applies only to the national
bank, so presumably, a financial subsidiary should be able to sell title insurance, which
would provide an additional incentive to transfer insurance agency activities to a financial
subsidiary of a national bank.377 A grandfather provision permits a national bank or its
subsidiary to continue any title insurance activities (underwriting or sale) "actively and
lawfully" conducted before the enactment of GLB. 378 However, a national bank with no
affiliate other than a subsidiary that underwrites insurance may not directly engage in
underwriting title insurance.379 In addition, if a national bank has an affiliate that
underwrites insurance but is not a subsidiary of the bank, neither the bank nor its
subsidiary may underwrite title insurance pursuant to the grandfather provision.
380
Although a national bank's title insurance activities may continue pursuant to this
grandfather provision, the grandfather proviso in effect pushes out the title insurance
activities from the bank to an existing separate subsidiary or affiliate engaged in
insurance.
3. State Banks and State Bank Subsidiaries
State banks and their subsidiaries, as a general matter, are prohibited by the FDICIA
from engaging in insurance underwriting even if permitted under state law, except to the
extent that activity is permissible for national banks.3 81 The new insurance underwriting
373. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 121, 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a (West Supp. 2000) (section 121 does not
impose any population limit for financial activities of financial subsidiaries, including the sale of insurance).
374. In a December 7, 1999 letter, the OCC authorized Bank of America to convert its insurance subsidiary,
Bank of America Insurance Services, Inc., from an operating subsidiary into a financial subsidiary. Rob Garver,
Bank ofAmerica Is First to Seek Approval to Move Insurance Unit to HQ City, AM. BANKER, Dec. 29, 1999, at
2. The move will free Bank of America from the place of 5,000 restriction.
375. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 303(a), (b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6713(a), (b)(1) (West Supp. 2000). A state
"wild card" statute permitting a state bank to engage in any activities authorized for a national bank is not
considered a state statute authorizing the sale of title insurance. Id. § 303(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6713(b)(2).
376. Id. § 303(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6713(b)(1).
377. Id. § 303(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6713(a); see also Larocco, supranote 336, at 7.
378. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 303(c)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6713(c)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
379. Id. § 303(c)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6713(c)(3).
380. Id. § 303(c)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6713(c)(2).
381. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(b) (1994) (governing state banks); id. § 183la(d)(2) (governing subsidiaries of
state banks). State banks or their subsidiaries providing crop insurance on or before September 30, 1991 may
continue to provide such insurance if the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation reinsured them. Id. § 1831 a(b)(2).
A grandfather provision also permitted well-capitalized state banks and their subsidiaries to continue to provide
insurance lawfully provided as of November 12, 1991 to residents of the state, those employed in the state, or
other customers who formerly resided or were employed in the state. Id. § 1831a(d)(2)(B). An additional
exception permitted a subsidiary of an insured state bank to provide title insurance if before June 1, 1991 the
bank was required to provide such insurance as a condition to obtaining a charter under state law. Id. §
1831 a(d)(2)(C).
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restrictions for national banks in GLB also restrict the underwriting ability of state banks.
Thus, state banks cannot underwrite title insurance unless they fall within one of the
limited exceptions provided in the FDICIA. 382
GLB does not answer definitively whether state banks may issue annuities if so
authorized under state law. GLB clearly prevents national banks from issuing annuities.
But if annuities are not insurance, then they are not subject to the underwriting
prohibitions. Moreover, a state bank or its subsidiary could apply for the FDIC's
permission to issue annuities as a principal.383
Insurance agency activities, if permitted under state law, are not linked to national
bank powers since the FDICIA only limits a state bank's activities as principal.384 In a
state that authorizes title insurance sales for its state banks, those sales may continue
under GLB. Although national banks under GLB generally may not engage in the
underwriting or sale of title insurance, a national bank may sell title insurance in a
particular state to the same extent as a state bank.385
A state bank, to the extent permitted by state law, may own a subsidiary that
engages in activities comparable to those permitted by GLB for a national bank's
firancial subsidiary.3 86 The conditions for establishing a financial subsidiary of a state
bank mirror those that must be met to establish a financial subsidiary of a national
bank.387 In addition, a state bank may retain existing subsidiaries (that may not qualify as
financial subsidiaries) and continue to engage in activities lawfully conducted by such
subsidiaries as of the date of GLB's enactment. 388 Moreover, a state bank subsidiary may
still apply to engage in new activities pursuant to section 24 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, bypassing the requirements necessary for establishing a financial
subsidiary.3 89
4. Functional Regulation of Insurance Activities
The interplay of federal law and state law will likely continue to be troublesome in
spite of the detailed provisions of GLB addressing this issue. For an FHC that operates a
subsidiary engaged in insurance, GLB provides for functional regulation. That is, the
insurance company subsidiary is to be regulated by its functional regulator, the state
382. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
383. To approve this activity, the FDIC would have to find that (a) the state bank is in compliance with all
relevant capital standards, and (b) the activity poses no significant risk to the deposit insurance fund. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831a(a)(l), (2) (1994). A list of the activities approved by the FDIC is maintained at http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/resources/approved/index.html. FDIC, Equity Investments. Real Estate Activities and Other FDIC-
Approved Investments and Activities (Oct. 17, 2000). See also supra notes 297-298 and accompanying text
(describing controversy about bank issuance of retirement CDs, a type of annuity).
384. 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(a) (1994). State banks selling insurance are also subject to regulations regarding
retails sales practices, solicitations, and advertising. See infra note 403.
385. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 303(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6713(b) (West Supp. 2000).
386. See id. § 121 (d)(1), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831w (adding § 46 to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act).
387. Compare Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 121 (d)(l), 12 U.S.C.A. 1831w(a) (West Supp. 2000) (listing
conditions for state banks) with id. § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a (listing conditions for national banks). For
requirements necessary to establish a financial subsidiary, see supra notes 353-356.
388. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 121(d)(1), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831w(b) (West Supp. 2000).
389. Id. § 121(d)(1), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831w(d)(1).
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insurance regulatory authority. 390 GLB has special provisions for the "functionally
regulated subsidiaries" of an FHC, such as an insurance company or a securities firm, and
seemingly preserves the primacy of the functional regulator. 39 1 Moreover, GLB reaffirms
the McCarran-Ferguson Act's requirement that state law, rather than federal law, regulate
insurance. 392
The FRB, however, is the primary federal regulator of an FHC, just as it is of a bank
holding company pursuant to the BHCA. It is referred to as the "umbrella" regulator, and
it retains "oversight" jurisdiction over the insurance company subsidiary of an FHC.393
Although GLB attempts to delineate the scope of the FRB's authority with respect to a
so-called "functionally regulated subsidiary," such as an insurance company, there
remains opportunity for regulatory conflict.
394
To the extent that a depository institution or its financial subsidiary engages in
insurance activities, there is further opportunity for conflict between the primacy of state
regulation of insurance and the regulatory authority otherwise asserted over the
depository institution and its financial subsidiary. 395 The opportunity for federal
preemption presents itself when the depository institution is federally chartered by the
OCC (a national bank) or the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) (a federal thrift). This
issue, of course, was at the heart of the Barnett Bank case where, prior to the enactment
of GLB, the Supreme Court declared that a national bank could conduct insurance agency
activities in Florida pursuant to section 92 of the NBA, in spite of Florida's limitation on
such activities. 396 The McCarran-Ferguson Act did not apply to ensure the primacy of the
state statutory provision because section 92 of the NBA specifically related to insurance
and therefore, pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, preempted state law.
GLB prohibits states from preventing or significantly interfering with the ability of
insurance companies to become an FHC, acquire stock in a depository institution, or
reorganize from mutual to stock form.39 7 GLB attempts to resolve any potential conflict
by reaffirming the primacy of state regulation of insurance 398 and providing that states
390. Id. § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6711.
391. Id. See McKoy, supra note 370, at §12.0212] (discussing the functional regulation provisions of GLB).
392. See id. § 104(a), (b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6701(a), (b).
393. Id. § 111, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1844(c); see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-434, at 157 (1999), reprinted in 1999
U.S.C.C.A.N. 245, 252 (describing "the Board's role as an umbrella supervisor").
394. Larocco, supra note 336, at 7 (the author, the managing director of the American Bankers Association
Insurance Association, predicts there will be litigation over the unclear line between the powers of state
insurance regulators and federal banking regulators).
395. Stephen Piontek, Top Ten Stories of 2000, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH - FIN. SERVS. ED.,
Jan. 3, 2000, at 27 ("We're going to see suits about whether certain activities are permissible or non-
permissible; whether the courts owe deference or not; and whether state insurance departments can really tell a
bank anything it doesn't want to hear and make it stick."); see also Steven Brostoff, GLB "s Insurance
Provisions Called 'A Morass', NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH - FIN. SERVS. ED., Feb. 14, 2000, at 13
(reporting that a state insurance regulator and a top official at the OCC agreed that the GLB insurance
provisions are an "interpretive morass" likely to spur litigation between state insurance regulators and federal
banking regulators).
396. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 37 (1996); see supra Part III.C
(discussing the effects of the case)
397. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 306, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6715 (West Supp. 2000).
398. Id. § 104(a), (b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6701(a), (b). According to Julie Williams, Chief Counsel of the OCC,
the section 104 standard to determine the applicability of state insurance laws to banks is quite complicated.
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cannot discriminate against FHCs or depository institutions by preventing or restricting
their insurance activities. 399 Nor are states permitted to regulate insurance in a manner
that discriminates adversely against depository institutions or their affiliates. 400 The
statute designates thirteen specific "safe harbors" in which states may regulate the
insurance activities of depository institutions without fear of preemption.40 1 These safe
harbors deal with consumer protection areas and are modeled after provisions in the
insurance laws of Illinois and New York. They include the following: (1) tying of
insurance to other products such as loans; (2) misrepresenting the insured or guaranteed
status of an insurance product in advertisements; (3) providing a written disclosure that
an insurance product is not a bank deposit, not FDIC-insured, and not guaranteed by the
bank; (4) limiting commission payments to licensed insurance agents; (5) prohibiting
referral fees to nonlicensed individuals based on whether the referral results in a
transaction; (6) prohibiting the release of insurance information to nonaffiliated third
parties to be used for soliciting or selling insurance; (7) prohibiting the use of health
information obtained from insurance records without the express written consent of the
customer; (8) prohibiting the use of force-placed insurance in transactions; and (9)
requiring maintenance of separate insurance books and records that must be made
available to state insurance regulators for inspection.40 2
GLB invites states to regulate the insurance sales practices of banks and sets forth
areas of regulation that will be immune from attack by federal regulators. The Act
Steven Brostoff, OCC Says S.900 Has Plusses And Minuses For Banks In Insurance, NAT'L UNDERWRITER
LIFE & HEALTH - FIN. SERVS. ED., Jan. 31, 2000, at 3.
399. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 104(c), (d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6701(c), (d) (West Supp. 2000); see Notice of
Request for Preemption Determination, 65 Fed. Reg. 35420-02 (June 2, 2000); Michele Heller, OCC May
Override W. Va. Law, AM. BANKER, June 1, 2000, at 4 [hereinafter Heller, OCC May Override]. The 1997
West Virginia Insurance Sales Consumer Protection Act contains several restrictive provisions. First, it
prohibits financial services employees with lending responsibilities from soliciting the sale of insurance. Lee
Ann Gjertsen, Insurers See Fight Looming on OCC Preemption of States, AM. BANKER, July 13, 2000, at 1.
Second, the law prohibits banks from requiring or implying that the purchase of an insurance product is a
condition to the approval of a loan and makes a bank wait until after a loan has been approved before making an
insurance-related referral or solicitation. See id. at 1. Additionally, the law provides for enhanced privacy
protection of information obtained during an insurance transaction and, most importantly, the law requires that
the sale of an insurance product take place in an office physically separate from the bank's lending department.
See id. at i. The West Virginia Bankers Association asked the OCC to preempt the West Virginia statute under
GLB § 104(d)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6701(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2000), while the Professional Independent
Insurance Agents of West Virginia argued that GLB § 104(d)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6701(d)(2)(B) (West Supp.
2000), specifically allows states to enact stronger consumer protection laws. See Heller, OCC May Override,
supra, at 1; Gjertsen, supra, at 1.
The Massachusetts Bankers Association has requested that the OCC preempt some provisions of the
Massachusetts insurance statute relating to bank sales of insurance. Michele Heller, In Brief: Insurance Group
Asks Override of R.l. Law, AM. BANKER, July 27, 2000, at 20 [hereinafter Heller, Insurance Group Asks]. The
Financial Institutions Insurance Association renewed its 1996 preemption request of Rhode Island insurance
statutes that prohibit bank loan officers from selling insurance, forbid the sale of insurance and other bank
products in the same transaction, require insurance sales to take place in an office physically separate from
banking offices, and prohibit banks from using private customer information to sell insurance. Id. at 20. It is
estimated that at least thirty states have consumer protection similar to the type at issue in the West Virginia and
Rhode Island provisions relating to bank sales of insurance products. Gjertsen, supra, at I.
400. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 104(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6701(e) (West Supp. 2000).
401. Id. § 104(d)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6701(d)(2)(B).
402. Id. § 104(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6701(d)(2)(A).
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maintains federal bank regulators' authority over insurance sales by banks by requiring
the federal banking agencies to adopt, by November 11, 2000, regulations on consumer
protection relating to the sale of insurance.4 03 Such regulations are to relate to sales
practices, disclosures, and advertising; separation of banking and nonbanking activities
within the bank office; and prohibition against domestic violence discrimination.
Moreover, the federal banking agencies must jointly develop a consumer grievance
process for insurance sales by banks. If there is a conflict between state consumer
protection provisions and these federal regulations, the stricter provisions control.
404
Inevitably, there will be issues regarding federal preemption of state laws regulating
insurance. In such an event, GLB provides for expedited judicial review in an appropriate
United States Court of Appeals within sixty days of the date the petition is filed.
40 5 Most
significantly, GLB requires that the reviewing court consider "all questions presented
under State and Federal law... without unequal deference." 406 This new standard also
abrogates the standard of review for federal agency interpretations of federal statutes
under Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,407 which
provided that a federal agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute be given
"controlling weight."'40 8 Deference will continue to be afforded to the OCC in its
interpretation of the NBA vis-a-vis state insurance statutes adopted before September 3,
1998.4 09 One effect of GLB may be to prod state legislatures to carefully review their
statutes and adopt provisions consistent with the safe harbors, rather than relying on
existing state statutes.
The FRB (along with other federal banking regulators) is prohibited from
prescribing regulations for; seeking or issuing orders against; imposing restraints,
restrictions, guidelines, requirements, safeguards or standards on; or taking enforcement
action against a functionally regulated subsidiary of an FHC, including an insurance
company. 4 10 There are significant exceptions to this general prohibition against FRB
403. Id. § 305(a), 12 U.S.C.A, § 1831x(a). The federal banking agencies are to issue such regulations "after
consultation with the State insurance regulators, as appropriate." Id. § 305(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831x(a)(3).
Comments on the proposed regulations, jointly issued by the OCC, FRB, FDIC, and OTS, are due October 5,
2000. Consumer Protections for Depository Institution Sales of Insurance, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,882 (proposed Aug.
21, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 14, 208, 343,536).
404. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 305, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831x(g)(2) (West Supp. 2000); see Alex Maurice,
NAIC Seeks Transformation To Stay Viable, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH - FIN. SERVS. ED., Mar. 27,
2000, at 6 (expressing concern that consumer protection will lose out); see also Trevor Thomas, Bank Insurance
Sales Rising Despite Growing Pains, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH - FIN. SERVS. ED., Jan. 3, 2000, at
3 (speculating that adding federal regulations relating to banks selling insurance on top of state laws relating to
insurance might be troublesome).
405. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 304, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6714 (West Supp. 2000). The appropriate court of
appeals is the circuit in which the state regulating insurance is located or the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. §
304(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6714(a). The 60-day period for review may be extended upon agreement by all parties.
Id. § 304(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6714(b).
406. Id. § 304(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6714(e); see also Brostoff, supra note 398, at 3 (reporting that Julie
Williams, Chief Counsel for the OCC, has wondered what this means and how this standard applies to
interpretations of fact).
407. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
408. Id. at 844.
409. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 104(d)(2)(C)(i), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6701(d)(2)(C)(i) (West Supp. 2000).
410. See id. § 112(b), § 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831v(a).
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involvement in the activities of the insurance company as a functionally regulated
subsidiary of the FHC. For instance, the FRB may intervene and take any action
necessary to prevent or redress an unsafe or unsound practice or breach of a fiduciary
duty if there is a "material risk" posed to a depository institution affiliate and if action to
address that risk, limited to just the depository institution, will not effectively protect
against the risk.4 11 In addition, the FRB retains the authority to examine the functionally
regulated subsidiary in order to understand its operations and financial condition. Thus,
the FRB can gauge the operational risks the subsidiary presents to the affiliated banks and
thrifts and monitor compliance with any specific law the FRB has jurisdiction to
enforce. 4 12 The FRB is required to obtain information about the functionally regulated
subsidiary from other regulators, publicly available information, or from audited financial
statements. 4 13 The functionally regulated subsidiary is required to furnish any such report
to the FRB at its request. In the event the FRB needs additional information, it is required
to request that the functional regulator obtain such report on behalf of the FRB.4 14 If the
requested report is not made available to the FRB by the functional regulator, the FRB
may request the functionally regulated subsidiary to submit the report directly to the
FRB. The functionally regulated subsidiary must comply with the FRB's request if the
report is needed to assess a "material risk" to the holding company or any of the
depository institution subsidiaries, or if the report is necessary to assess compliance with
GLB or any other federal law the FRB has specific jurisdiction to enforce.4 15
The banking regulators--the OCC, the FDIC, and the FRB--may, pursuant to GLB,
impose restrictions on transactions between their regulated banks and nonbank affiliates
for the purpose of avoiding any significant risk to the safety and soundness of such
institutions, including an "undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair
competition, conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices." 4 16 This complicated
regulatory regime will likely be tested sooner rather than later. Regarding banks'
engagement in insurance, GLB has shifted the focus from Congress to the states-as
regulators of insurance-and the courts-who will be left to interpret the exact content of
the overlapping regulatory structure created by GLB.4 17
5. GLB's Impact on the Regulation of Insurance, Including Privacy Concerns
GLB mandates that by November 12, 2002, a majority of the states4 18 establish
either uniform insurance licensing requirements for agents4 19 or enact reciprocity laws
411. Id. § 112(b), § 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831v(a); id. § 113, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1848a.
412. Id. § 111, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1844(c).
413. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 111, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1844(c) (West Supp. 2000).
414. Id.
415. Id. § 111, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1844(c)(2)(B).
416. Id. § 114, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828a.
417. Look Forward to a Busy Year On Capitol Hill, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH - FIN. SERVS.
ED., Jan. 10, 2000, at 18.
418. GLB defines "state law" for this purpose to include the following 57 jurisdictions: the fifty states plus
the District of Columbia, "Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the
Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands." Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 315(13), 15 U.S.C.A. 6735(13)
(West Supp. 2000). Thus, 29 jurisdictions are required to constitute a majority of the states.
419. Id. § 321(a), 15 U.S.C.A. 6751(a). Uniformity must be met in areas relating to "integrity, personal
qualifications, education, training, and experience of licensed insurance producers;" continuing education
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permitting the licensure of nonresidents to sell insurance within the state.4 20 Presumably,
uniformity or reciprocity will ease the burdens on interstate banking organizations
attempting to market insurance to customers in multiple states.42 1 Of course, prior to
GLB, this burden on multistate insurance operations existed for any insurance company
marketing insurance in more than one state. 422 The uniform approach to insurance
licensing of agents will facilitate bank sales of insurance by those banks operating in
more than one state and will likely be welcomed by insurance companies as well. The
NAIC has drafted a Producer Licensing Model Act that it believes satisfies GLB's
requirements. The NAIC recommends that states adopt this Model Act prior to GLB's
November 2002 deadline.423 So far, Kentucky is the only state to enact insurance
licensing laws that meet the minimum requirements of GLB.
4 24
The consequence of a sufficient number of states failing to meet the uniformity or
reciprocity requirements by GLB's November 12, 2002 deadline could be severe. If the
requisite number of states fail to act, the NAIC must establish by November 12, 2004, the
National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers (NARAB). 4 25 This private,
nonprofit entity would be managed and supervised by the NAIC.42 6 To become a
member of the NARAB, a state-licensed insurance producer must meet certain criteria to
be established by the NARAB. 427 NARAB membership entitles the member to licensure
in each state for which the member pays any required fees and meets the bonding
requirements.
4 2 8
Other proposed reforms to the insurance regulatory regime have been spawned in
the wake of GLB. For instance, the American Bankers Association's Insurance
requirements; ethics courses; and product suitability requirements. Id. § 321(b)(l)-(4), 15 U.S.C.A. §
6751 (b)(I)-(4). States may not impose any additional requirements on nonresident insurance producers pursuant
to GLB's reciprocity requirements. Id. § 321(b)(5), 15 U.S.C.A. § 675 1(b)(5).
420. Id. § 321(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6751(aX2).
421. See Maurice, supra note 404, at 6 (expressing concern that states will "give away the store" to the
insurance industry so that the industry will not support federal regulation of insurance). See also Steven
Brostoff, Without Uniformity, NAIC Is 'History': Mirel, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH - FIN. SERVS.
ED., Apr. 10, 2000, at 6 (expressing concern that there will be a "race to the bottom" among state insurance
laws).
422. See Jim Connolly, NAIC Expediting 'One-Stop' Filing Plan, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH -
FIN. SERVS. ED., Mar. 20, 2000, at 1 (detailing burdens of getting new products approved); Kenneth Kehrer,
Comment, State Insurance Regulation Fails Industry and Consumer, AM. BANKER, July 24, 2000, at 8
(describing how state regulation of insurance interferes with interstate commerce).
423. Eileen Canning, Insurance: Insurance Industry on Schedule to Craft Uniform Standards, Senators
Told, BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. 13, 2000, at d5; Can NAIC Confound The Skeptics On The Sidelines? NAT'L
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH - FIN. SERVS. ED., Mar. 27, 2000, at 34 (commenting that the NAIC is slow-
moving and bureaucratic and must recreate itself fast or face extinction).
424. Canning, supra note 423, at d5. The NAIC reports that four states-Kentucky, Missouri, New
Hampshire, and North Carolina-have adopted legislation regarding reciprocity. NAIC, State Status Regarding
Legislation, at http://www.naic.org/NARAB/statestatus-legislation.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2000).
425. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 321(d), 322, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6751(d), 6752 (West Supp. 2000).
426. Id. § 324, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6754.
427. Id. § 325(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6755. GLB mandates that these criteria are to "include standards for
integrity, personal qualifications, education, training, and experience." Id. § 325(d)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. §
6755(d)(1).
428. Id. § 325(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6755(e); see also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 333, 334, 15 U.S.C.A. §§
6763, 6764 (West Supp. 2000).
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Association (ABAIA) has approached the issue of insurance regulation much differently
than GLB and has proposed that a national charter option be created for insurance
companies. In the ABAIA's view, uniform licensing requirements could be imposed by
federal regulation more efficiently and effectively than by each state's legislature or
insurance commissioner. 42 9 The American Council of Life Insurers also recently
announced that it supports an optional federal charter for insurance companies.430
Insurance companies are also affected by GLB's new provisions relating to privacy
of customer information.4 31 Although discussions regarding financial modernization
legislation had been ongoing for many years, the introduction of privacy into the
legislative debate was one of the new features of GLB. 432 These new provisions have
already proved to be quite controversial. GLB requires that the various federal regulatory
agencies adopt regulations to implement GLB's privacy provisions by November 13,
2000.433 Privacy regulations have been issued and will take effect on that date, but will
not be enforced by the agencies until July 1, 2001, in response to vigorous lobbying by
financial institutions asking for additional time to come into compliance with the new
regulations.4 34
429. See Timothy J. King, Insurers Should Get Dual Charter System Like Banks', AM. BANKER, Apr. 28,
2000, at 10. But see Eileen Canning, Insurance: State Legislators Blast Proposal to Create Federal Insurance
Commissioner, BNA Banking Daily, May 8, 2000, at d6 (reporting that the American Council of Life Insurers
also advocates a dual chartering system for insurers comparable to that available for banks.); Steven Brostoff,
Insurer Groups Bash Dual-Charter Proposal, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH-FIN. SERVS. ED., Jan.
10, 2000, at 10 (opposing the proposal are the National Association of Independent Insurers, the Alliance of
American Insurers, and the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies).
430. Adam Wasch, Insurance: Insurance Group Issues Proposal to Centralize Agent. Broker Licensing,
BNA BANKING DAILY, June 14, 2000, at d5. The House Commerce Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous
Materials held hearings in July and September that also considered the merits of an optional federal charter for
insurers. Christian Bruce, Insurance: Witnesses at House Hearing Debate Merits of Federal, State Charters,
BNA BANKING DAILY, Sept. 20, 2000 at d4.
The efficiency of state insurance regulation was questioned in a recent report issued by the
Government Accounting Office that examines the alleged embezzlement of more than $200 million in insurance
company assets by Martin Frankel. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INSURANCE REGULATION:
SCANDAL HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR STRENGTHENED REGULATORY OVERSIGHT (2000), available at
http://www.gao.gov/.
431. See generally Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Title V, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6801-6827 (West Supp. 2000)
(establishing minimum federal standards for privacy and providing a mechanism to protect the confidentiality of
a consumer's personal financial information).
432. See Julie L. Williams, Ignore Privacy Concerns at Your Own Risk, AM. BANKER, June 25, 1999, at 9
("In the last Congress, discussions of privacy were at the periphery of the debate over modernizing the financial
services industry."). See generally David W. Roderer, Tentative Steps Toward Financial Privacy, 4 N.C.
BANKING INST. 209, 210-11 (2000) (describing the reaction to alleged use of customer account information by
U.S. Bancorp as leading to the last-minute inclusions of privacy provisions in GLB).
433. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 510, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681s note (West Supp. 2000) provides that except for
section 504 (privacy rulemaking) and section 506 (protection of Fair Credit Reporting Act), Title V provisions
relating to privacy shall take effect six months after the date on which rules are to be prescribed under section
504(a)(3). This works out to one year following enactment, or November 13, 2000. Section 510(a)(1)
specifically provides that a later effective date may be specified in the rules. Id. The federal agencies have
specified November 13, 2000, as the effective date, but have extended the time for compliance to July 1, 2001.
Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,162 (June 1, 2000).
434. See id.
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The basic outline of the privacy provisions is not complex. The component
institutions of an FHC may share certain customer information.43 5 This provision is of
vital importance to FHCs because it enables cross-marketing, including the marketing of
insurance products to bank customers. Customers may, however, "opt out" to prevent
their FHC from sharing private information about them with nonaffiliates. 436 The statute
provides some significant exceptions to the general prohibition against providing
customer information to those outside the FHC. Nonpublic personal information may be
provided to a nonaffiliate if necessary to perform services for the FHC (e.g., marketing an
institution's own products) or pursuant to a joint marketing agreement between several
institutions.4 37
An important, and potentially costly, requirement in GLB is that a financial
institution disclose its privacy policy to a consumer at the time of establishing a customer
relationship and on an annual basis during the continuation of the relationship.438 The
final prong of the privacy provisions is that states may adopt more stringent privacy
provisions, and more stringent state privacy provisions shall prevail over the federal
privacy regime.439
A fundamental question for insurance companies is whether GLB's basic privacy
provisions apply to insurance companies or whether states are required to adopt
provisions at least as stringent as those set forth in GLB to regulate their own insurance
companies. 440 Insurance companies that provide variable insurance products are subject
435. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 502(e)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6802(e)(1) (West Supp. 2000). Other laws limit
the sharing of specific types of information, such as medical information.
436. Id. § 502, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6802(b)(1)(B).
437. Id. § 502(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6802(b)(2). Other exceptions permit information sharing with
nonaffiliates and include information necessary to service or process a financial product or service requested by
the customer. Id. § 502(e)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6802(e)(1)(A).
438. Id. § 503(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6803(a). Ken Reynolds, executive director of the Association of Banks-in-
Insurance, estimates that 2.6 billion privacy notices will need to be sent to financial institution consumers.
Steven Brostoff, Privacy Legislation Draws Industry Fire, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH - FIN. SERVS.
ED., May 8, 2000, at 1; see also Michele Heller, $1 Per Privacy Notice Is Bank One Target, AM. BANKER, May
25, 2000, at 4 (projecting industry-wide compliance costs at $1.25 billion to send 2.5 billion disclosure
statements). Although enforcement of this provision will not begin until July 1, 2001, regulators will start to
monitor financial institutions' progress towards compliance this fall. See Michele Heller, Regulators Push Early
Privacy Compliance, AM. BANKER, May 30, 2000, at 5.
439. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 507, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6807 (West Supp. 2000). It is uncertain whether or
how state legislation can affect the basic structure of GLB's privacy provisions. For instance, may states prevent
sharing of inter-affiliate information, or may they require that customers "opt in" and affirmatively elect to
permit information sharing among affiliates? See Jim Connolly, Insurers, Regulators Differ On Privacy
Guidelines, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH - FIN. SERVs. ED., Mar. 13, 2000, at 3 (stating that many
state insurance commissioners favor the opt in approach). Legislators in California have drafted bills that would
require a financial institution to get a customer's permission before sharing any information with an affiliate or
a third party. Michele Heller, Conflicting Federal Laws Fuel Showdown Over States' Rights to Legislate
Privacy, AM. BANKER, Apr. 17, 2000, at 1. Though the Fair Credit Reporting Act bars states from restricting
how a bank shares customer information with its affiliates until January 1, 2004, privacy advocates argue that
the Sarbanes amendment to GLB trumps the FCRA and gives state legislatures the right to pass stricter privacy
provisions. Id.
440. Compare Steve Tuckey, Small Life Firms Get National Voice, INS. AccT., May 29, 2000, at I
(affirming that though confusion exists as to whether insurance companies are subject to the GILB rules, the
general consensus is that they will be followed until states say otherwise), with Steven Brostoff, Delay of
Privacy Regs Draws Sharp Reactions, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH - FIN. SERVS. ED., May 15, 2000,
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to the privacy regulations promulgated by the SEC in addition to regulation by state
insurance commissioners. 44 1 A number of states have begun to consider privacy
legislation more stringent than GLB. 442 This state legislation would apply to insurance
companies operating within the state and, if more stringent than GLB, to all financial
institutions doing business within the state. 44 3 The state-by-state approach to privacy
regulation will be cumbersome for insurance companies and other financial institutions
who may find themselves subject to different privacy requirements in each state in which
they do business.4 4 Furthermore, if states impose more stringent privacy provisions only
on insurance companies, those companies will be at a disadvantage with other financial
services institutions.445 In response, the NAIC has proposed a Model Privacy Bill for
adoption by the states. 446 Insurers are concerned that these proposals go far beyond
GLB's requirements.4
47
at 22 (claiming that the regulations apply specifically to federally regulated industries rather than state regulated
insurance). George Nichols, president of NAIC, lamented that when Congress failed to work out privacy rules
for insurance companies, lawmakers passed the buck to the insurance commissioners. Kevin Guerrero, Ky.
Insurance Chief Asks Stricter Privacy Measure, AM. BANKER, May 18, 2000, at 5. Nichols wants Congress to
"finish the job" and enact a higher privacy standard that applies to banks, brokers, and insurers. Id. In the
meantime, Nichols says that the NAIC has no plans to recommend stricter privacy rules for insurance
companies for fear of placing them at a competitive disadvantage with other financial companies. Id.
441. See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg. 12,354 (proposed Mar.
8, 2000) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. pt. 248); Brostoff, supra note 440, at 22; Kimberly Smith, Variable
Insurers Face New Privacy Rules, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH - FIN. SERVS. ED., Apr. 3, 2000, at 8.
442. Legislation has been introduced in twenty two states. See Connolly, supra note 439, at 3. However, not
much has happened beyond the initial flurry of legislative introductions. See Michele Heller, Backers Hope
Privacy Laws Get a Second Wind, AM. BANKER, May 15, 2000, at 1. Even California, New York, and
Minnesota, which are among the most activist states on privacy, lack the support necessary to pass stricter
legislation. See id. See also Gerald B. Silverman, Privacy: New York Legislature Adjourns, Leaving Financial
Privacy Bills Stalled, BNA BANKING DAILY, June 27, 2000, at d5 (reporting that New York's legislature
adjourned "without reaching agreement on a number of key privacy bills"). Three states-Vermont,
Connecticut, and Alaska--reportedly already have state statutory standards that exceed the privacy protections
mandated by GLB. See Sarah McDonald, Vermont's Tough Opt-In Privacy Law Could Be Model for Other
States, AM. BANKER, July 6, 2000, at 1.
443. There remains a significant issue as to whether a state could adopt a statute requiring customers to opt
in before financial information could be shared among affiliates. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Pub.
L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970), bars states from restricting a bank from sharing information with affiliates
until January 1, 2004. See Michele Heller, Conflicting Federal Laws Fuel Showdown Over States' Rights to
Legislate Privacy, AM. BANKER, Apr. 17, 2000, at II (describing the debate over whether the so-called
Sarbanes provision in GLB trumps the FCRA).
444. See Connolly, supra note 439, at 3 (finding that the patchwork approach to privacy will confuse
customers and make compliance with the privacy rules quite complex).
445. Id.; Adam Wasch, Privacy: New Financial Services Law May Cause Loss of Existing State
Protections, BNA BANKING DAILY, June 1,2000, at d2.
446. See Lee Ann Gjertsen, State Regulators' Try to Standardize Privacy Rules Has Insurers Worried, AM.
BANKER, June 13, 2000, at 1; Eileen Canning, Insurer Regulators Eye Personal-Data Shield, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 13, 2000, at 5 (noting the NAIC proposal adopts a controversial opt-out provision for sharing of personal
health information). A summary of the NAIC's Privacy and Consumer Financial and Health Information
Regulation may be found at http://www.naic.org/lpapers/models/models.htrnl.
447. Gjertsen, supra note 446, at 1; R. Christian Bruce, Privacy: Insurance Group Urges July 1, 2001, As
Compliance Deadline for Privacy Rules, BNA BANKING DAILY, June 13, 2000, at d5 (urging state insurance
regulators to also set July 1, 2001, as the compliance date for state privacy rules); see also States Advised To
Create Financial-Privacy Legislation That Parallels U.S. Law, BESTWIRE, May 12, 2000.
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Even while the debate over proper privacy protections is being conducted in the
federal regulatory arena and in the state legislatures, Congress may have not yet had its
last word on the subject. Protecting the privacy of consumer financial information is a
cause that plays well in election year politics. Legislation proposed by President Clinton
was recently introduced that would undo one of the major tenets of Title V of GLB and
provide an opt-in mechanism for sharing information between affiliates of an FHC.4 48
Chairman Jim Leach of the House Banking Committee has proposed legislation that
would prohibit financial institutions from sharing medical financial records and preclude
a financial institution from using a customer's medical information in providing credit
absent the customer's consent.
449
6. GLB "s Impact on Insurance Companies' Entry into Banking
An insurance company or its holding company may take advantage of GLB and
acquire a bank. 4 5 0 Indeed, for an entity interested in combining financial services and
nonfinancial activities, there are potential advantages to be gained by structuring the
bank-insurance combination as an insurance company acquisition of a bank. If an
insurance company becomes an FHC for the purpose of acquiring a bank, it may continue
to engage in all prior lawful nonbanking activities it was engaged in as of September 30,
1999. This grandfather provision lasts a minimum of ten years, and the FHC may apply
for an additional five-year extension for a total of fifteen years of continued commingling
of banking and nonfinancial activities. 4 5 1 To take advantage of this grandfather
opportunity, the FHC must be "predominantly engaged" in financial activities, and only
those activities it was engaged in on September 30, 1999, or in those other activities
permitted under GLB.452 It is possible, of course, that during the fifteen-year grandfather
period, the ability of FHCs to engage in activities beyond financial activities will be
448. The Clinton bill has been introduced as S.187 by Senators Leahy (D-Vt.) and Sarbanes (D-Md.) and as
H.R. 4380 by Representative LaFalce (D-Ny.). Implementation of Privacy Legislation Delayed, CREDIT RISK
MGMT. REP., May 15, 2000, 2000 WL 11846418 (setting forth the main differences between GLB and the
Clinton bill). Contrary to GLB, this bill would establish an "opt-in" system for all information sharing, allow
consumers to correct their personal information, and greatly restrict the use of medical information. See id.; see
also Steven Brostoff, Congress Revisits GLB Privacy Provisions, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH - FIN.
SERVS. ED., Mar. 27, 2000, at 38 (predicting that the proposed federal legislation is a template for potential state
privacy legislation); Steven Brostoff, Privacy Legislation Draws Industry Fire, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE &
HEALTH - FIN. SERVS. ED., May 8, 2000, at 1.
449. See Medical Financial Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 4585, 106th Cong. (2000); Eileen Canning, Some
Bankers, Insurers See Positives in Changes in Medical Financial Privacy Bill, BNA BANKING DAILY, June 29,
2000, at d4; Canning, supra note 446, at 5.
450. MetLife recently announced that it intended to take advantage of GLB and enter the banking market,
although it is as yet undecided as to whether it will acquire a bank or begin a de novo bank. Liz Moyer, New
MetLife Division Will Offer Bank Services, AM. BANKER, May 19, 2000, at 1; David Reich-Hale, Decision for
MetLife: Buy Bank or Build One?, AM. BANKER, May 22, 2000, at 1; Joseph Treaster, Metropolitan Life Says it
Aims to Start a Full-Service Bank, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2000, at CS.
451. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(n)(7) (West Supp. 2000).
452. Id. § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(n)(1). "Predominantly engaged" is defined as when annual gross
revenues of the holding company (excluding the depository subsidiaries) from financial activities or those that
are incidental to a financial activity are 85% or more of annual gross revenues of the holding company. Id. §
103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(n)(2). This revenue requirement must be met on a continuing basis. Id. § 103(a), 12
U.S.C.A. § 1843(n)(4).
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significantly expanded by further congressional action or regulatory expansion.
45 3
Chairman Gramm of the Senate Banking Committee lists as his chief regret regarding the
historic legislation that bears his name that it did not permit combinations between
banking and nonfinancial activities. 454 He predicts that such combinations will be the
next stage in the evolution of the regulation of FHCs.
45 5
While granting this significant grandfather right for nonfinancial activities, Congress
did limit the grandfathered activities in several significant ways. First, grandfathered
commercial activities may not be expanded through merger or consolidation with another
company.4 56 Second, cross-marketing of nonfinancial activities to customers of
depository subsidiaries is prohibited, although the statute does permit statement inserts
and Internet web sites advertising the commercial products if the FRB approves them as
consistent with certain statutory criteria.457 Finally, revenues from impermissible
activities cannot exceed fifteen percent of an FHC's consolidated gross revenues (after
deducting all revenues from the depository institution subsidiaries). The obvious
drawback for an insurance firm seeking to enter banking by becoming an FHC and
acquiring or beginning a bank is subjecting the FHC to the umbrella supervision of the
FRB.
GLB also closed the unitary thrift holding company loophole that permitted
nonbanking companies (including insurance companies) to establish a single thrift
subsidiary. 45 8 However, an insurance company that acquired or applied for a thrift
charter by May 4, 1999 is grandfathered as a unitary thrift holding company and may
continue to conduct all of its prior authorized activities.4 59 The grandfathered unitary
453. See Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 47,696 (proposed Aug. 3,
2000) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. pt. 225) (FRB's request for public comments on proposed rule to permit an
FHC to act as a "finder" in bringing buyers and sellers together pursuant to the GLB authority for an FHC to
engage in activities that are financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity); see also Pssst! Reform
Really Did Let Commerce In, AM. BANKER, June 2, 2000, at I (prediction of Peter J. Wallison that restrictions
on commercial activities will fall as the line between financial and commercial activities is continually
redrawn).
454. Dean Anason, Senate Passes Reform Bill; Gramm Calls For a Sequel, AM. BANKER, Nov. 5, 1999, at
I (predicting that GLB's separation of business and financial services will prove as anachronistic as Glass-
Steagall's separation of commercial banking and investment banking).
455. Id.
456. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(n)(3) (West Supp. 2000). This prohibition
does not apply to a company that controls a broadcast station that has been under the control of an insurance
company since January 1, 1998. Id § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(n)(3). The prohibition against acquisition will
continue to apply, however, if the acquirer is one of the five largest domestic bank holding companies based on
consolidated total assets. Id. § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(n)(3). This exception appears to apply only to
Jefferson-Pilot Financial, an insurance company which owns JP Communications, which in turn owns several
broadcast stations.
457. Id. § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(n)(5). To approve statement inserts or website marketing, the FRB
must find that "the arrangement is in the public interest, does not undermine the separation of banking and
commerce, and is consistent with the safety and soundness of depository institutions." Id. § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1843(n)(5).
458. See supra Part II.H.
459. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 401(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1467a(c)(9)(C) (West Supp. 2000); see Lee Ann
Gjertsen, Insurer Group Tries Banking, AM. BANKER, June 28, 2000, at I (announcing the opening of a thrift
by the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies); Alex Maurice, Insurers Bank on Future With
New Thrifts, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH - FIN. SERVS. ED., Apr. 17, 2000, at 11 (noting that State
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thrift holding company may not sell its grandfathered rights or have them acquired by
another company.46 0 GLB does not, however, prevent the grandfathered unitary thrift
holding company from expanding by conducting its own acquisitions.
GLB unburdens nonbank banks grandfathered by the CEBA in 1987 from a number
of limits imposed upon them by the CEBA, including cross-marketing restrictions, the
inability to engage in new activities, and the prohibition on asset acquisitions.4 6 1 Finally,
trust companies remain a possible point of entry for insurance companies into a limited
range of banking services.4 62
A final aspect of GLB that facilitates insurance companies' entry into banking via an
FHC is the provision permitting mutual insurance companies to redomesticate to another
state for the purpose of converting to stock status.463 An insurance company organized in
the mutual form and owned by policyholders may wish to convert to stock status to raise
the capital necessary to expand its financial services activities and to put it in a form that
permits it to be owned by an FHC. Some states have laws that are not favorable to
mutual-to-stock insurance company conversions. This GLB provision eases the process
of converting to stock status by permitting a mutual insurance company to easily
redomesticate to a state whose laws are favorable to the stock conversion.
D. Potential Effects of Restructuring
Initially, the possibility of banks combining with insurance companies was heralded
as the greatest contribution of GLB to reshaping the financial services landscape.4 64 At
the time of GLB's passage, the opportunity to combine with securities firms had already
been significantly exploited through section 20 subsidiaries of bank holding
companies. 465 Although many banks were engaged in insurance agency activities at the
time of GLB's enactment, underwriting of insurance was essentially forbidden. These
early predictions of a flurry of bank and insurance company mergers have, at least so far,
not come true.46 6 In the first months following the enactment of GLB, it appears that
Farm Bank, owned by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, could eventually offer banking
services through its 16,000 agents located nationwide). Notably, applications by Wal-Mart and Dillard's
department stores did not meet the May 4, 1999 statutory deadline. Financial Reform Bill Wrap-Up, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 28, 1999, at4.
460. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 401(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1467a(c)(9) (West Supp. 2000).
461. Id. § 107(a), Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat 1338, 1359 (1999) (striking 12 U.S.C. § 1843(0(3) (1994)).
462. Maurice, supra note 459, at 11 (describing MassMutual's formation of a limited purpose trust
company). Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company recently announced a joint venture with Northern
Trust that will establish trust services for high-wealth customers. Sweeney, supra note 269, at 55 (Northern
Trust customers get special insurance products from Northwestem Mutual Life.).
463. A mutual insurance company is even authorized by GLB to redomesticate to a state that permits it to
convert to stock form without having to distribute its equity to its policyholders. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§
311-316, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6731-35 (West Supp. 2000).
464. See Cheryl Winokur, Citi, Wells, BB&T Among Likeliest Buyers of Big Insurance Companies, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 7, 2000, at 1.
465. See H. Rodgin Cohen, Section 20 Affiliates of Bank Holding Companies, I N.C. BANKING INST. 113,
113 (1997).
466. See John Kocjan & Mike Laporta, Comment: Why Bank-Insurer Mergers Don't Make Sense, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 23, 2000, at 7 (suggesting reasons that bank-insurance combinations are unlikely to result in
synergy).
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banks are treading cautiously when it comes to insurance underwriting, 46 7 and are instead
taking advantage of additional opportunities to expand their agency activities. 46 8 For
instance, in some states where statutes or regulations previously prevented affiliations
between banks and insurance agents, those rules are changing pursuant to GLB's
mandate, presenting the opportunity for state banks in most states to begin insurance-
agency activities. 4 69
The continuing bank focus on agency activities suggests that many bankers feel
"they do not need to own the factory in order to sell the product." 470 A bank interested in
insurance products may indeed find the best of both worlds by partnering with an
insurance underwriter to devise new insurance products that the bank may then sell to its
customers. 47 1 There are a number of reasons banking companies currently disfavor
acquisition of an insurance underwriter. The additional regulatory burdens of owning an
insurance underwriter and the risks posed by underwriting have given some bankers
pause to reflect on whether insurance underwriting is in the long-term, best interests of
their shareholders. Insurance companies in general have a lower return on equity than
most banking institutions, suggesting to some that bank-insurance combinations would
not be viewed favorably by the market.4 72 Some observers have suggested that market
forces might account for the current disinterest by banks in insurance companies. Bank
stocks are at a low point which makes them poor currency for acquisitions. 47 3
Notwithstanding banks' general disinterest in insurance company acquisition, some
banking organizations are quite interested. 474 Citigroup, of course, already owns
Travelers Insurance Company and recently announced its intention to buy the fifteen
467. Winokur, supra note 464, at 1.
468. See id.; Craig Woker, Texas Banks, Thrifts Given Insurance Sales Guidelines, AM. BANKER, Jan. 27,
2000, at 9; David Reich-Hale, Broker Scoring Big with Bank-Insurer Deals, AM. BANKER, June 14, 2000, at I
(reporting that "[blanks are buying insurance agencies in record numbers").
469. See Woker, supra note 468, at 9 (discussing recent changes in insurance sales guidelines in Texas and
likely changes in Ohio); see also Deborah Lohse, Approval Path For Insurers May Shorten, WALL ST. J., Mar.
14,2000, at A3.
470. See Winokur, supra note 464, at 1.
471. See Thomas, supra note 404, at 3 (Banks will likely continue to enter insurance through arrangements
with third-party agencies to sell insurance in bank offices.); Lee Ann Gjertson, MassMutual Tailors Products
for Bank Sales, AM. BANKER, June 16, 2000, at 7 (describing MassMutual's development of products geared to
bank customers); James R. Kraus, Consolidation Ahead, U.S. BANKER, June 2000, at 30, 31 (predicting that
"large financial conglomerates will strike marketing alliances with insurance companies and eventually merge
with them").
472. See Sweeney, supra note 269, at 55 (stating that the Bank industry's return on equity (ROE) is 15-
20%, while the insurance industry's ROE is 10-12%); Bob Stein, Viewpoints: Look at the Numbers, and Don't
Be So Ready to Write OffBank-Insurer Deals, AM. BANKER, June 30, 2000, at 9 (reporting that bank ROEs are
at 18-20%, while life insurance ROEs are at 14-15%); see also Lee Ann Gjertsen, Firmer Insurance Market
May Attract Banks, AM. BANKER, July 6, 2000, at 6 (suggesting that slow premium growth made insurance
companies unattractive to banks and speculating that recent increase in insurance premiums might make
insurance companies more attractive to banks).
473. See Winokur, supra note 464, at 1.
474. See id. Standard & Poor's predicts that upon a bank-insurance combination, the rating of the insurance
company would be adjusted downward to reflect the generally lower ratings for banks. Thomas, supra note 404,
at 3.
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percent of Travelers Property Casualty that it does not already own.4 7 5 The low price-to-
earnings ratios at which insurance companies are currently trading make them attractive
targets for companies like Citigroup that are trading at more favorable ratios.476 Although
the low return on equity of insurance companies has been cited as a reason to shy away
from an insurance company purchase, some banks believe that an insurance-bank
combination presents opportunities to increase the insurance company's profitability by
reducing overly high capital levels, 477 utilizing bank technology to achieve cost savings,
taking advantage of cross-selling opportunities, and reducing costs by decreasing reliance
on independent insurance agents and increasing reliance on the bank product delivery
system. For those banking companies concerned about the expertise necessary to operate
an insurance underwriter, ING Group, the Netherlands's third largest bank,4 78 announced
that it has had discussions with several of the "top-20" U.S. banks about providing the
back office operations for the insurance organization on a fee basis.
47 9
Most observers believe that banking companies, which generally have a larger
market capitalization than insurance companies, are more likely to acquire insurance
companies than vice versa. Insurance company stocks are also currently in decline with
price-to-earnings ratios that generally are even less than those of banking companies.
480
An insurance company wishing to buy a bank would need to become a bank holding
company and simultaneously an FHC, subjecting itself to the umbrella regulation of the
FRB. 48 1 Insurance companies regulated exclusively at the state level may well be
reluctant to volunteer for federal regulation. Although MetLife has announced that it will
buy a bank,4 82 the remainder of the insurance companies interested in achieving "cradle-
to-grave" financial services have utilized the thrift charter. In part, this is because many
insurance companies established or applied for a thrift charter prior to the May 4, 1999
grandfather date for unitary thrift holding company treatment set forth in GLB.
4 83
Continued use of the thrift charter is also attractive as a way to avoid application of GLB
and FRB oversight of the FHC. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance recently received a
475. Robert McGough & Deborah Lohse, Citigroup Move Could Presage a Frenzy of Insurer Takeovers,
WALL ST. J., March 23, 2000, at CI.
476. Id. (finding that Citigroup is trading at 18 times earnings, while Travelers is trading at about 11 times
earnings).
477. Id.
478. James R. Kraus, ING of Netherlands Applying to Enter U.S. Retail Market, AM. BANKER, Dec. 10,
1999, at 1.
479. Cheryl Winokur, ING Positioned to Run Insurers that Banks Buy, AM. BANKER, Mar. 10, 2000, at 1.
480. See McGough & Lohse, supra note 475.
481. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(4)(B) (West Supp. 2000); see supra notes
337-340 and accompanying text.
482. Lee Ann Gjertsen, MetLife Has Big Plans for One-Branch Bank, AM. BANKER, Aug. 17, 2000, at 1
(describing MetLife's purchase of a small national bank in New Jersey). MetLife must qualify as an FHC and
submit itself to oversight regulation by the FRB. One industry analyst commented that because MetLife was
subject to state regulation in fifty different states, "being regulated by the Fed might be a welcome relief." Id.
483. See supra notes 242-245 and accompanying text; see also David Reich-Hale, Insurer Heading for
Bank Turf with 16,000 Branches, AM. BANKER, June 21, 2000, at I (describing State Farm Insurance
Company's banking activities conducted through its federal savings and loan created with OTS approval in
November 1998).
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limited thrift charter from OTS enabling it to offer trust products and services through a
federal savings bank, Northwestern Mutual Trust Co. 4 8 4
Many industry observers predict that European financial firms will be the first to
exploit the new insurance company affiliation opportunities presented by GLB and that
these firms will move to purchase U.S insurance companies. 485 Two principal reasons are
given to support this prediction: expertise and size. 48 6 European financial firms have for
many years been operating insurance and banking operations side-by-side and thus feel
comfortable with the challenges posed by operating an insurance company. 4 87 In part,
because these combinations have been allowed for a number of years, many European
financial firms are significantly larger than U.S. insurance companies and have the size to
acquire a major U.S. finn. For instance, ING Group recently announced its agreement to
acquire ReliaStar Financial Corp., the eighth-largest publicly held life insurance company
in the United States. 488 Many foreign financial firms will also view GLB as an
opportunity for them to acquire banks in the United States. Prior to GLB, foreign firms
484. Rob Garver, New Trust Rival: Northwestern Mutual, AM. BANKER, Aug. 15, 2000, at 5. See supra
note 462.
485. Winokur, supra note 464, at 1. Indeed, a number of foreign firms have been granted permission by the
FRB to become financial holding companies. Stephen Piontek, Top Ten Stories of 2000, NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH - FIN. SERvS. ED., Jan. 3, 2000, at 27 (predicting that U.S. insurers will be
acquired by foreign financial services conglomerates). Some commentators have expressed concern that the
FRB is not as favorable to foreign firms desiring to become FHCs in its proposed regulations as it should be.
For example, when the FRB released a list of the first 117 banks to qualify as FHCs on March 12, 2000, only
nine foreign banks were on the list, which did not include any German, French, or Italian banks. Rob Garver,
Foreign Banks Say U.S. Reforms Leave Them at a Disadvantage, AM. BANKER, Mar. 16, 2000, at 1. Gerard De
Graaf, of the European Commission, claimed that many European banks were effectively deterred from
applying because of several contentious points. Id. For example, the FRB rule contains a "leverage
requirement" that would force foreign banks to hold more capital than their home country regulators require
(the FRB rule requires Tier I capital equivalent to 3% of balance sheet assets). Id. Effectively, a European bank
conducting business in the United States would have to submit to FRB regulation of both its United States and
home country operations, creating a fear among many Europeans that the FRB is trying to establish itself as the
world banking regulator. See id.
486. James R. Kraus, ING's Bid for Aetna Called Only the Beginning, AM. BANKER, Mar. 3, 2000, at 4;
Winokur, supra note 464, at 1.
487. "Banc-assurance" refers to the vertical integration of banks and insurance companies, whereby retail
insurance products become core banking products distributed through bank branches. The practice is prevalent
in Europe, especially France where over 50% of insurance is distributed through banking channels. Dave
Kaytes, Banks Should Not Replicate the Insurance Agency Model, AM. BANKER, Jan. 30, 1996, at 10. Prior to
GLB, banc-assurance appeared in limited form in the United States as many banks began selling credit-related
insurance.
488. ING of Netherlands Offers $5.1 billion for ReliaStar Financial Corp., WALL ST. J., May 2, 2000, at
A2 I; Nikhil Deogun & Deborah Lohse, ING Group Is Nearing Bid for ReliaStar in Latest Cross-Border Deal,
WALL. ST. J., Jan. 1, 2000, at A4. As part of its ReliaStar acquisition, ING has an application before the OTS to
purchase ReliaStar Bank, a federal savings bank. Dutch ING Is Granted Thrift Charter, AM. BANKER, July 6,
2000, at 4. ING also announced, following several aborted attempts, a purchase of Aetna's international and
financial services businesses. Lee Ann Gjertsen & David Reich-Hale, ING Joins US. Insurance Elite with Deal,
AM. BANKER, July 31, 2000, at 7. ING Group also recently had its application to establish a federal thrift
approved. Financial Institutions: 07S Clears ING Group's Bid to Open Federal Thrift Institution, BNA
BANKING DAILY, July 5, 2000, at d4. This "approval marks, the first such transaction by a foreign banking
company." Id.; see also Kraus, supra note 471, at 31 (describing other foreign firms' acquisitions of U.S.
insurance operations, including Swiss Re's acquisition of Underwriter Re Group from Allegheny Corp., and
Aegon, N.V.'s purchase of Transamerica).
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engaged in insurance activities were not permitted to acquire U.S. banks under the
BHCA.489 GLB removes this obstacle to foreign ownership of U.S. banking
organizations. So, whether a foreign financial firm wishes to purchase a U.S. bank or a
U.S. insurance company, the acquisition may be accomplished pursuant to GLB with
minimal impact on the foreign firm's existing operations.
GLB enables the creation of full-service financial companies combining banking,
insurance, and securities. GLB's most dramatic change from prior law is the
authorization of bank-insurance combinations. It remains too early to tell how many
firms will follow Citigroup in combining these two financial activities. Banks and
insurance firms considering this route should, however, carefully anticipate the operating
burdens imposed by functional regulation at the state level by the state insurance
authorities coupled with oversight regulation at the federal level by the FRB.
V. FUNCTIONAL OR DYSFUNCTIONAL REGULATION?
GLB endorses a regulatory structure based on functional regulation. The premise of
functional regulation is that financial products can be classified into discrete categories
and that each product category should be regulated in the same manner and by the same
regulator. Theoretically, functional regulation should ensure fair competition among
different entities offering similar products and promote regulatory efficiency and
specialization by a regulator concentrating in regulating discrete functions.490 GLB
created a specially defined category for a "functionally regulated subsidiary" of an
FHC.49 1 The Act requires that many of the activities to be conducted by an FHC be
pushed out into the appropriate functionally regulated subsidiary of the FHC. For
instance, Title II of GLB requires that many bank securities activities be "pushed out" to
securities affiliates and be subject to SEC regulation.492
Although the basic regulatory model is relatively easy to describe and initially
appears to make good sense, a more detailed examination reveals a number of flaws.
First, financial services products often do not fall clearly within one particular function,
even when the financial services functions are divided broadly into the categories of
banking, securities, and insurance. Second, prior to GLB's endorsement of functional
regulation, financial services were no longer being sold by discrete providers of financial
products so that forcing products into a "functionally regulated subsidiary" is counter to
489. See Krauss supra note 478, at 1; Arthur D. Postal & Laura Mandaro, Financial Reform Bills: Good
News for Int ' Banks, THOMSON'S INT'L BANKER, July 12, 1999, at I.
490. See Paul A. Caldarelli, Bank Growth in the Investment Company Industry: Do Guidelines Issued by
the Comptroller of the Currency Compensate for Bank Exclusion from Statutory Provisions of the Federal
Securities Laws Defining "Broker/Dealer" and "Investment Adviser"?, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 11, 45 (1995);
Melanie L. Fein, Functional Regulation: A Concept for Glass-Steagall Reform?, 2 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 89,
90 (1995) ("According to its history, functional regulation seeks to promote competitive equality, regulatory
efficiency, and investor/consumer protection."); Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in Multisectored Financial
Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 387-88 (1999); Heidi Mandanis Schooner,
Regulating Risk Not Function, 66 U. CN. L. REV. 441, 459 (1998) (recounting arguments made in favor of
functional regulation).
491. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 121, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1373 (1999) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.A.); see also supra Part IV.C.2-3.
492. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Title I, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1384 (1999).
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now established business practices permitting one entity to provide numerous products
subject to functional regulation by more than one regulator. Finally, the concept of
functional regulation clashes with modem technology.49 3
Innovative financial services products do not necessarily conform to GLB's broad
functional financial categories of banking, securities, and insurance. Thus, an important
issue under this new system of functional regulation is which functional regulator should
regulate which product. The development and functional categorization of variable
annuities demonstrates the problem of a financial product not falling easily into just one
functional regulatory category.494 As recounted earlier in this Article, insurance
companies first developed variable annuities in an effort to meet increasing competition
provided by mutual funds. 495 As insurance company products, variable annuities are
subject to regulation by the applicable state insurance regulator. The Supreme Court ruled
in 1959, and reaffirmed in 1967, that variable annuities, although offered by insurance
companies, are securities and therefore subject to regulation by the SEC.496 That holding
might seem to affirm the utility of functional regulation, but later events demonstrated the
futility of placing variable annuities in only one functional category. In 1964, the
Supreme Court declined to review the Third Circuit's ruling that the separate accounts
maintained by insurance companies for variable annuities should be regulated as
investment companies subject to the Investment Company Act.4 97 Finally, in the 1995
VALIC I case, the Supreme Court characterized variable annuities as "financial
investment instruments" rather than insurance.49 8 As such, their sale was permitted by
national banks as part of the business of banking. When products such as variable
annuities can be placed in more than one functional category, a single, discrete product
remains subject to regulation by multiple governmental agencies.49 9 Thus, functional
regulation still struggles with the basic definitional problem of in which functional
category or categories a particular financial service product should be placed.5 00
493. An additional criticism leveled at functional regulation is that "no single regulatory authority may
have overall responsibility for one entity's solvency and risk management." Jackson, supra note 490, at 388.
The FRB's role as the umbrella supervisor is GLB's attempt to meet that criticism.
494. See Bert Ely, Comment, Functional Regulation Flunks - It Disregards Category Blurring, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 21, 1997, at 4 (stating that variable annuities incorporate elements of insurance, banking, and
securities).
495. See supra Part II.F.
496. See SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1967); SEC v. Variable Life Ins. Co.,
359 U.S. 65, 71-73 (1959).
497. Prudential Ins. Co. v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383, 388 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964). The SEC
subsequently granted relief so that insurance companies were able to avoid most investment company
regulation. See supra Part I1.G.
498. NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251,260 (1995). See supra Part II1.C.
499. Similarly, fixed annuities fall into two separate categories: insurance and banking. Ely, supra note
494, at 4. Deposit products with interest rates tied to stock indices could be functionally regulated as either a
bank product or a securities product. Rob Garver, D.C. Speaks: Ludwig: Chop Regulators to Just One, AM.
BANKER, May 26, 2000, at 1. A guaranteed investment contract could be regulated as an insurance product or a
bank product. Fed Chief Sees Need To Overhaul Oversight, WASH. WATCH, May 22, 1995, at 2 (expressing
concerns of FRB chairman, Alan Greenspan).
500. Former Comptroller of the Currency, Eugene A. Ludwig, criticizes functional regulation because
evolving financial products do not fit in old functional categories. Garver, supra note 499, at 1; see also
Schooner, supra note 490, at 476 ("The functional regulatory model assumes incorrectly that financial products
may be divided and conquered," but the "blending of financial products will continue.").
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A second problem with functional regulation is that it fails to consider the
development of multiproduct financial services providers. Prior to GLB's enactment, it
was quite common for a single entity to engage in banking and insurance or some other
combination of financial functions. Many banks became financial supermarkets offering
a broad range of financial services, including banking, securities, insurance, and
derivatives.50 1 Of equal importance, broker-dealers competed with banks and insurance
companies. Merrill Lynch even formed its own life insurance company in 1986.502 At the
same time, insurance companies developed securities businesses. 503 Hannover Re, the
German reinsurer, announced that it was planning to issue bonds that would be backed by
life insurance policies.5 04 "Their effect will be increasingly to blur the distinction
between insurance and investment banking.
505
GLB, of course, endorses and facilitates the creation of financial services
supermarkets under the common ownership of an FHC. Each subsidiary of the FHC
engages in certain functions and is functionally regulated. This model for providing and
regulating financial services might have worked if GLB had been adopted when each
financial services provider offered distinct products and before new products were
created that crossed traditional product boundaries. 50 6 But, as financial services and their
regulation developed over time, each separate entity, through creative lawyering and
loophole mining, found its way into new product areas. 50 7 The result was that prior to
GLB, one entity-as just previously discussed-sold multiple products including hybrid
products that did not fit the traditional product classifications.
GLB recognizes this reality and attempts in various provisions to "push out"
products into the "appropriate" functionally regulated subsidiary. However, GLB itself
contains numerous exceptions from this grand scheme that indicates effective functional
regulation is not likely to occur. For instance, insurance companies may still engage in
banking through a grandfathered unitary thrift holding company, a grandfathered
nonbank bank, or a limited purpose trust company, as described above. 50 8 Functional
regulation under GLB is premised, however, on the notion that banking activities and
insurance activities will be conducted in separate functionally regulated subsidiaries of an
501. See Cohen, supra note 465 at 114; Death By a Thousand Cuts: Can the Independent Agents Who Sell
Insurance to Consumers Survive the Change that is Sweeping Their Industry?: Are Insurance Agents Obsolete,
ECONOMIST, April 19, 1997, available at 1997 WL 8136660; Randall Smith & Charles Gasparino, Salomon 's
Gains are Registering as Part of Citi 's 'Supermarket,' WALL ST. J., March 2, 2000, at Cl; see also supra Part
III (discussing bank involvement in insurance).
502. MERRILL LYNCH LIFE INS. CO., MERRILL LYNCH FUNDS RETIREMENT PLUS PROSPECTUS 6 (Dec.
1996).
503. Saks, supra note 341, at 326.
504. Finance and Economics: An Earthquake in Insurance, ECONOMIST, Feb. 28, 1998, at 73.
505. Id.
506. Karen Shaw Petrou, Holding Company Structure Made Reform Law Old-Hat from the Start, AM.
BANKER, June 30, 2000, at 8 (arguing that functional regulation may have been possible when first proposed in
1986, but that today it amounts to unscrambling financial products that fall into more than one regulatory
category).
507. The "balkanization of an institution's operations and services based on function, rather than the
institution's individually tailored operational plan," has also been criticized for undermining attempts to offer
"one-stop shopping" and impairing the application of consolidated risk management. Fein, supra note 490, at
112.
508. See supra Parts II.H, 1Il.E.
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FHC. Similarly, banks may still engage in insurance in the following ways: national
banks as agents under section 92 of the NBA, state banks as agents pursuant to state law
and the FDICIA, all banks as underwriters of credit-related insurance, and state banks as
underwriters of title insurance when authorized by state law.50 9 This continuing mixture
of functions within a single entity is a byproduct of the ability of financial services frms
to exploit statutory and regulatory loopholes to expand into other financial services areas.
GLB also continues the use of grandfather provisions, such as that for unitary thrift
holding companies, perpetuating the opportunity for some entities to sell multiple
products subject to regulation by different functional regulators. 5 10 Thus, a single entity
may be subject to multiple regulators. This system, resulting in duplication of effort and
conflict among regulatory standards and authorities, is needlessly costly and
inefficient. 5 11 The complexity of this morass is further exacerbated by the large number
of potential regulators of banking-viewed under GLB as a single functional
product--and the fifty-seven different potential regulators of insurance-also viewed as a
distinct functional product.5 12
Numerous complications will undoubtedly result. Under GLB, a large financial
services provider such as Bank of America or Citigroup will be monitored by a host of
regulators that will include all of the state insurance commissions, state bank regulators,
state securities regulators, the SEC, the CFTC, the SROs (i.e., the stock and commodity
exchanges, the NASD and the NFA), the Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, the
FRB, the Department of Justice, and even the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).5 13 This
system of regulation will not be efficient or coordinated. Past experience with functional
regulation provides numerous examples of conflicts. The SEC has for years engaged in
various jurisdictional battles with the CFTC and bank regulators. 514 The states have
509. See supra Parts IV.C.2-3. Financial subsidiaries of banks may also engage in insurance agency
activities. Id.
510. Even prior to GLB, there were several notable examples of regulators reaching across traditional
borders to provide functional regulation. For example, a subsidiary of Prudential Insurance Company of
America was censured and fined $20 million by the NASD for deceptive sales practices in selling variable life
insurance. Bridget O'Brian, Prudential Fined $20 Million by NASD Over Its Sales of Variable Life Insurance,
WALL ST. J., July 9, 1999, at Cl. NationsBank and its affiliate, NationSecurities, were disciplined by the SEC
for blurring the distinctions between their banking and securities operations and creating customer confusion
about banking and securities products. See In re NationSecurities and NationsBank, N.A., Exchange Act
Release No. 39,947, 1998 SEC LEXIS 833, at *20-26 (May 4, 1998).
511. Under the functional model, regulated institutions answer to multiple regulators resulting in increased
costs. See Schooner, supra note 490, at 460; see also Fein, supra note 490, at 109 (finding that functional
regulation "will likely increase, rather than decrease, the regulatory burden on banking organizations. The
multiple regulators required under a functional regulation system will result in fragmented regulation and
duplicative, inconsistent, and excessive regulatory requirements.").
512. Depository institutions come in a variety of forms: banks, savings associations, and credit unions.
MACEY & MILLER, supra note 71, at 66-69. Each institution type may be chartered at the state or federal level.
Id. Thus, a depository financial institution and its activities, depending on charter choice could be regulated by
the OCC, a state banking regulator, the FDIC, the FRB, the OTS, a state savings institution regulator, the
National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund, a state credit union regulator, or some combination of the above.
Id.
513. See Glenn R. Simpson, As FTC Rides Herd on the Web, Marketers Begin to Circle the Wagons, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 29, 2000, at BI.
514. These included fights for regulatory control over transfer and clearing agencies, margin requirements
for derivative instruments, and regulation of derivative dealers. See, e.g., 23 & 23A JERRY W. MARKHAM &
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variously proved to be inadequate regulators of financial services in the securities area
(requiring federal intervention) or too intrusive (requiring federal preemption).5 15 A
recent example of regulatory conflict is the controversy relating to banks' accounting for
loan loss reserves. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the SEC, and
federal bank and thrift regulators view this issue from different perspectives and have yet
to reach agreement as to the proper methodology to account for these reserves. 5 16
Similar conflicts among different functional regulators are likely to arise under
GLB. For instance, to preserve the historical primacy of state regulation of insurance,
GLB establishes a concept of "not unequal deference" when conflicts arise between state
insurance regulators and federal banking regulators. 5 17 This concept is a curious blend of
normal principles of federal preemption of inconsistent state laws and substantial
deference to federal agency interpretations of federal statutes, and the McCarran-
Ferguson Act's anti-preemption rule which attempts to assure the primacy of state
regulation of insurance over federal intrusions. Thrown into this mix is the threat of
uniform regulation of insurance to be imposed through GLB's uniformity or reciprocity
requirements or eventually the creation of NARAB (to be supervised by a private entity)
to grant entry into insurance on a nationwide basis.
Moreover, federal agencies and state regulators are required under GLB to share
certain information and engage in coordinated rulemaking.5 18 Whether cooperation
among these various entities can be achieved and sustained remains to be seen. How
functional regulators and the FRB, as an FHC's oversight regulator, will interact is also
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW §§ 2.09[9],
8.02 (1999); Jerry W. Markham, Derivative Instruments: Obstacles to Their Regulation in US, in SWAPS AND
OFF-EXCHANGE DERIVATIVES TRADING: LAW AND REGULATION 276, 276-86 (Eric C. Betthelheim et al. eds.,
1996); Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commodity Futures Industry - History and
Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 59, 60, 117-21 (1991) [hereinafter Markham, Regulation of Margin].
515. Between 1910 and 1933, blue sky laws were adopted in all of the states except Nevada. LOUIS LOSS &
EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 17 (1958). Nevertheless, those laws proved to be ineffective because
they could not overcome the traditional legal rule of caveat emptor (i.e., let the buyer beware). See WILLIAM J.
SCHULTZ & M. R. CAINE, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 602 (1937). The federal securities
laws are also a reflection of the fact that the state blue sky laws were inadequate to regulate securities trading,
which is conducted largely on an interstate basis. Nevertheless, Congress did not preempt the state blue sky
laws until recent years when it was concluded that they were imposing redundant and unnecessary burdens. The
National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. section 29), exempted exchange and NASDAQ traded securities
from state registration requirements and prohibited the states from imposing regulations different from those of
the SEC on many broker-dealer activities.
516. The federal bank and thrift regulators released proposed guidelines as part of a July, 1999 agreement
with the SEC. Policy Statement on Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses Methodologies and Documentation
for Banks and Savings Institutions, 65 Fed. Reg. 54268 (proposed Sept. 7, 2000). The guidelines refer, however,
to reserves recorded under generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP), and the AICPA currently has
under consideration a proposal to change GAAP accounting for loan loss reserves. See Rob Garver, Regulators
vs. Accountants On Reserving for Losses, AM. BANKER, Sept. 8, 2000, at 4; see also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
§ 241, 12 U.S.C.A. § 78m note (West Supp. 2000) (requiring consultation and coordination between the SEC
and the appropriate federal banking agency prior to any SEC action against a depository institution based on the
institution's loan loss reserve reporting).
517. Jackson, supra note 490, at 390-91 (noting that an interesting feature is the "reluctance to pick
regulatory sides" to resolve the inevitable regulatory conflicts).
518. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 307, 12 U.S.C.A. § 6716 (West Supp. 2000).
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an open issue. 5 19 The FRB and the OCC, for instance, have taken very different views
about their respective regulatory roles under GLB. For instance, FRB Governor Laurence
Meyer has stated that the FRB "needs to know more about the activities within large
insured depository institutions [such as national banks] than can be derived from access
to public information or from the reports of the primary bank supervisors." 5 20 Jerry
Hawke, the Comptroller of the Currency and functional regulator of national banks,
contends that GLB requires the FRB to rely on the OCC and other functional regulators
"to the fullest extent possible" and that the FRB's role is confined to "helping to protect
banks from risks that might arise elsewhere in the corporate family, outside the bank.
52 1
The combination of these three financial services-banking, insurance, and
securities--in one FHC while trying to maintain the historical regulatory framework
governing each financial service will be a Herculean task. The regulatory structure that
continues to govern each separate financial service is very different, largely the result of
historical happenstance. 522 Meshing these very different regulatory systems, either within
an FHC or in a single entity subject to multiple functional regulators, is fraught with
difficulty.
As this Article describes, the regulation of insurance has always been state
dominated. Federal regulation was successfully resisted on several different occasions,
and the federal McCarran-Ferguson Act underscores the primacy of state regulation by
reversing the normal rule that federal laws preempt inconsistent state laws. Banks began
with state charters, and when national banks were created during the Civil War they were
supposed to replace state banks. However, regulatory competition and innovation by state
banks preserved them as viable entities and led to our current dual system of banking
regulation at the federal and state level. Within the banking industry itself, regulatory
arbitrage is evident as banks shift from state to national charters and vice versa, as
depository institutions change charter types among credit unions, thrifts, and banks, and
as the multitude of federal regulatory authorities fight turf wars among themselves.
Combining insurance (state-dominated regulation), securities (federal-dominated
regulation), and banking (dual state and federal regulation) in one holding company is
obviously a recipe for regulatory conflict.52 3
The confusion, complexity, and costly inefficiencies associated with functional
regulation are likely to put U.S. financial institutions at a severe competitive disadvantage
with European financial firms operating under a universal banking model with a single
519. See Eileen Canning, Financial Services: Fed's Ferguson Offers More Details on Fed's Role as
Umbrella Supervisor, BNA BANKING DAILY, May 31, 2000, at d7 (describing the increased coordination and
cooperation that GLB requires between the FRB and functional regulators).
520. Washington Comptroller Pokes Holes in Fed's Umbrella, AM. BANKER, July 28, 2000, at 1.
521. Id.
522. The financial services regulatory structure "is a product of history, not logic." Garver, supra note 499,
at I (quoting Eugene A. Ludwig, former Comptroller of the Currency).
523. See Jennifer Manvell Jeannot, Comment, An International Perspective on Domestic Banking Reform:
Could the European Union 's Second Banking Directive Revolutionize the Way the United States Regulates its
Own Financial Services Industry?, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1715, 1751-52 (1999) (asserting "that
inefficiencies, conflicting interpretations of regulations, and a lack of accountability still plague" the functional
regulatory system endorsed by GLB).
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regulator. 524 GLB's repeal of restrictions on affiliations between banks, insurance
companies, and securities firms was designed in part to make U.S. firms more
competitive with their foreign counterparts. It would, therefore, be ironic if the regulatory
structure adopted by GLB impedes effective competition with foreign financial services
firms. 525
A final reason that GLB's system of functional regulation is not likely to sustain
itself over time is that it clashes with modem day technology. Technology is reducing the
importance of the intermediation function traditionally performed by financial services
firms. 526 The Internet is turning financial services into a commodity that can be bought
online, just like a book or a new computer. 527 Utilizing technology to sell existing
customers new financial products may also be less expensive than acquiring a bricks-and-
mortar entity.52 8 Depositors may now bypass banks as places to deposit their savings in
favor of direct access to the capital markets to obtain higher returns not subject to
transaction costs imposed by an intermediary. Borrowers may similarly bypass banks and
go directly to the capital markets to borrow money at a lower cost. Information, expertise,
and reduction of transaction costs by pooling funds from various sources are some of the
reasons intermediaries have traditionally been successful.
Technology facilitates bypassing the intermediary in several ways. Technology
makes information readily available and reduces transaction costs a great deal. Expertise
may still give some intermediaries an advantage, but increased information reduces this
advantage. This same phenomenon may be seen in the insurance industry. Insurance
agents and their role as intermediaries are increasingly bypassed by technologically savvy
customers. An insured who buys directly from the insurance company need not pay a
commission to an insurance agent. Allstate Insurance Company announced in November
1999 that it would sell car and home insurance directly to consumers through the Internet
and over the telephone.529 Online companies stand ready to help consumers buy
524. The European Union's Second Banking Directive attempts, through its adoption of mutual
recognition, the single banking license, and the agreed-upon activities list to move all European Union countries
towards Germany's universal banking model. See id. at 1734; see also Garver, supra note 499, at I (stating that
former Comptroller of the Currency, Eugene A. Ludwig, predicts that capital will flow to less regulated foreign
financial firms from more regulated U.S. firms). Some states have recognized that this Byzantine regulatory
structure impedes progress and have adopted universal regulation of banking, insurance, and securities at the
state level. See, e.g., Craig Woker, Mich. Reform Law May Spur Creation of a Banker's Bank, AM. BANKER,
Jan. 24, 2000, at 7 (describing the governor of Michigan's governor's announcement of intention to combine
the regulatory departments for banks, brokerages, and insurance).
525. "[T]he European Union views the adoption of the universal banking model as a means of improving
its competitive position in the global marketplace." Jeannot, supra note 523, at 1738. Moreover, GLB does not
coordinate or enhance the supervisory structure to ensure safety and soundness, while the European Union
"placed great emphasis on coordinating its supervisory structure" when it reformed its banking laws. Id. at
1757.
526. See Ely, supra note 494, at 4 ("Technology increasingly empowers the principals in financial
transactions (buyers and sellers, payers and payees, borrowers and funders) to deal directly with each other.").
527. "[M]oe consumers are looking to the Web for financial services ... " Lee Ann Gjertsen, First Union
Buys Online Agency, AM. BANKER, July 26, 2000, at 8.
528. David Reich-Hale, Web Firms Helping Banks Sell Insurance on Internet, AM. BANKER, June 29, 2000,
at 7. Partnerships between banking and insurance web sites are also growing. David Reich-Hale, Quicken Tops
Web Insurer Study, AM. BANKER, July 17, 2000, at 10.
529. What's News, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1I, 1999, at Al.
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insurance on the Internet. One service allows consumers to review the offerings of fifty
major insurance companies so that they may find the best product and compare prices.5 30
To the extent a financial services finn no longer performs intermediation as its
primary function, the goals of regulation may be changing in a fundamental way.
Misconduct by the intermediary need not be a major goal of the financial institution's
regulation. Reform legislation, such as GLB, that essentially ignores this fundamental
change in the delivery of financial services is doomed to a short life, or at least a troubled
one.
Clearly, the functional regulatory structure envisioned by GLB does not comport
with this emerging environment of unified financial service providers. Nor has entity-
based regulation proven satisfactory.53 1 Regulators of different entities often adopt
separate regulatory approaches to address essentially the same issues.5 32 For instance, the
SEC has used the suitability concept as the center of its regulatory program for protecting
unsophisticated investors.5 33 The CFTC rejected such a concept in favor of risk
disclosures.534 Strangely, the bank regulators adopted disclosure for sophisticated
investors, but not for the ordinary retail customer.5 35 The SEC regulates margins, while
the CFTC does not; the Federal Reserve Board is ambivalent on the issue. 536 Such an
uneven regulatory playing field is unfair and invites artificial shuttling of activities into
the most favored entity with respect to each regulatory issue. Financial service firms
should not be placed in the middle of such conflicting regulatory approaches.
An alternative regulatory approach would cut across entity form and broad
functional categorization of financial products to regulate based on underlying risks.
Professor Heidi Mandanis Schooner advocates "[r]egulating risk, not function." 537 She
identifies the following three risks associated with banking and securities: insurance fund
risk, systemic risk (protection of the financial system), and unfairness risk (control of the
risk of fraud and abuse in financial markets).5 38 Bert Ely, a bank consultant, has argued
for a similar regulatory breakdown which he terms "goals-oriented regulation." 539 The
530. UNCAIum Leads Revolution in Online Insurance Shopping, CHAPEL HILL NEWS, Dec. 5, 1999, at A8.
531. Entity- or institutional-based regulation relies on the faulty premise that "different entities present
different regulatory issues." Schooner, supra note 490, at 477.
532. See Caldarelli, supra note 490, at 45 (calling for functional regulation to eliminate the "regulatory
arbitrage" that exists in an entity-based regulatory scheme).
533. 23A MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 514, at ch. 9.
534. Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor-Jungle Predator or Shorn Lamb? 12 YALE J.
ON REG. 345, 369 (1995).
535. Id.at370n.111.
536. Markham, Regulation of Margin, supra note 514, at 117-21.
537. Schooner, supra note 490, at 487.
538. Id. at 478-79. Professor Schooner proposes a reassignment of regulatory responsibility as follows:
insurance fund risk by the FDIC, systemic risk regulated by the FRB, and unfairness risk by the SEC. Id. at 485-
86. Melanie Fein, a Washington D.C. lawyer and banking author, has also criticized functional regulation for
many of the same reasons as Professor Schooner. See Fein, supra note 490, at 109-13 (criticizing functional
regulation); Jackson, supra note 490, at 387-97 (1999) (commenting on some likely failures of a system based
on functional regulation).
539. Ely, supra note 494, at 4. The first goal of this regulatory structure would be to protect solvency and
systemic stability through regulation of deposit insurance, the payment system, and liquidity. Id. The second
goal would be to protect consumers through fair dealing regulations (disclosure and protection from fraud), fair
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Authors also advocate consideration of a risk-based regulatory regime that cuts across
various financial products.
Borrowing Professor Schooner's risk categories and Mr. Ely's examples of
necessary risk regulation, insurance fund risk should involve protection of customer
funds that are on deposit with a retail financial services firm. This would include such
things as the segregation of customer funds and administration of account insurance,
which could be conducted by a single regulator. Systemic risk regulation could include
uniform capital requirements, payment system regulation, and financial system liquidity.
Unfairness risk regulation would encompass fair dealing with consumers by protecting
only "retail" versus sophisticated customers. The securities industry has long recognized
that institutional and other sophisticated market participants do not need the same
regulatory protections as unsophisticated investors. Sophisticated customers can protect
themselves in negotiations and redress any wrongs through their own lawyers. For these
reasons, institutional and other "accredited" investors are exempted from much of the
regulation that is applied to those dealing with "retail" customers. The CFTC has taken a
similar approach in regulating swaps and in other aspects of its regulations. The same
approach should be adopted for regulating other financial services. Banking, insurance,
and securities activities that do not directly involve an unsophisticated retail consumer
should be exempted from regulation.
By the same token, financial services for retail customers should be subject to
regulation, and the protections afforded such investors should cut across product lines.
This should include the prevention of fraudulent sales practices, prosecution of
"churning" of securities and "twisting" of insurance policies, fraudulent profit claims or
guarantees, and unauthorized trading or falsification of policy signatures ("windowing"
policies). 540 Multiple regulators are not needed to police those very similar problems.
Financial services should be viewed as single product regulated by a limited number of
regulators based on a defined set of regulatory objectives.
VI. CONCLUSION
The passage of GLB has opened the door a bit wider to competition for the offer and
sale of financial services across traditional, institutional lines. That is commendable and
is a recognition of the fact that broad ranges of financial services are being offered by
single institutions. This provides consumers with choice as well as price competition.
Technological innovation, including the Internet, is further improving access to financial
services. Yet, while the market has changed, Congress has frozen its regulation along
traditional lines that it calls functional. There is nothing functional about the existing
regulatory structure, particularly in the case of insurance. State regulation is still in place
largely because James Hyde's excesses led to the Armstrong Committee's restrictions on
common stock investments. Insurance companies, therefore, avoided the ire of the New
Deal legislators. This historical happenstance hardly justifies regulation of modem
financial service firms by fifty state insurance regulators and a hodgepodge of federal
trading regulations (unfair market manipulations), and maintenance of competitive financial markets (antitrust,
market entry, and development of new products). Id.
540. See, e.g., Dawson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 932 F. Supp. 1509, 1516-17 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (discussing
"churning" and "windowing").
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regulators. Nor does this antiquated and duplicative regulatory structure provide adequate
regulation. GLB does not adequately address these issues relating to the regulatory
structure of financial services firms. This failure will surely haunt us in future years.
* * *
